After Hours radio interview with Tom Gradel, Dick Simpson and Rick Perlstein transcript

This is a transcription of Rick Kogan's After Hours radio interview with Tom Gradel, Dick Simpson and Rick Perlstein. It is downloadable here. Perlstein's article can be read here.

Rick Kogan (host): Welcome back to After Hours. I have sitting in the studio with me Tom Gradel and Dick Simpson who have just written a book called Corrupt Illinois: Patronage, Cronyism, and Criminality. And I thought well I'm going to have them sit in here while I interview on the phone Rick Perlstein. Rick how are you?

Rick Perlstein: Oh, wow that's great to hear. A bunch of Chicago legends.

Kogan: And I don't I don't plan this show, it just falls together this way. Rick is a noted historian and a journalist and has written a number of best-selling books, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus, all manner of other books.  But we're here to talk about this (I found) terrifying piece in the February issue of In these Times, "How To Sell Off a City. Welcome to Rahm Emanuel's Chicago, the privatized metropolis of the future." How did you come to write this, Rick? Have you been following the adventures and misadventures of Rahm Emanuel for some time?

Perlstein: Oh yeah. I've been on the Rahm Emanuel beat for oh a good ten years now. When he was the head of the Democratic Congressional campaign committee, you'll recall the Democrats took back the Congress in 2006. There was a very obvious reason for political observers why that happened. It was because the Democrats opposed the Iraq war and the Iraq War was very, very unpopular. But there was our guy Rahm you know from Winnetka stumbling to the microphone to take credit for it, and if you actually looked at the races that the Democrats won, a heck of a lot of them are won by candidates that he refused to back. And a bunch of candidates that he went to the wall for, like Tammy Duckworth, lost.

So I've always kind of found him a phony and as we know now from the documents in the Clinton administration, a real hack too. I mean, he was really going to bat for NAFTA, and whatever it took to get votes or money for Bill Clinton whether it was in stiffer criminal penalties or fighting against immigrants, really whatever it took.  And then, with the Obama administration when he was Chief of Staff, I was always stunned because he had this reputation as this tough guy, you know this bad boy, but we learned that when he was Chief of Staff his advice to Obama was never to go into any fight that he didn't know they would win in advance. So he was the guy who said we shouldn't be passing Obamacare. It took Nancy Pelosi to convince Obama to do that. So kind of everywhere down the road... and then of course he comes to Chicago...

Kogan: Did it surprise you that he ran for mayor of Chicago?

Perlstein: Did it surprise me that he ran for mayor of Chicago? I think he kind of wore out his welcome in Washington! I think he became a real toxic figure in the Obama administration, and yet he claims he always wanted to be mayor of Chicago.

Kogan: I thought he also claimed he wanted to be the first Jewish Speaker of the House, too, you know.

Perlstein: Well. That was wasn't happen going to happen. Right? I mean who knows, I don't find him very reliable.

Dick Simpson: One of the things we often say in Chicago is we send people off to Springfield and Congress to train them to come back to be aldermen. In this case Rahm came back and had a much higher office.

Perlstein: You know the mayor Addonizio of Newark said, there's no money in Congress, I want to be mayor of Newark.

Kogan: You must, in observing him - I mean you knew of course about Daley's parking meter deal and this intense kind of privatization mania -- I think you call it in here --that is germane to Chicago. There are a lot of other cities --before we talk about all the Rahm specifics -- there are a lot of other major cities who have not --

Perlstein: Yeah they've not gone down this road. The city of Atlanta sold off their water services to a privatizer. And it was such a disaster, the billing and the services, that you know, never again. Pennsylvania was thinking about a leasing a turnpike like we leased the Skyway and then they realized that it would cost people 80, 90, 100 bucks to cross the state of Pennsylvania, because basically the only reason investment bankers want these deals is they are basically given carte blanche to raise the prices. In fact that's why the Skyway is the most expensive chunk of road to drive in the United States of America.

So other cities have turned away, why has Rahm Emanuel gone for this? I think if you look to his two and a half years as an investment banker under the tutelage of the Republican, our now governor, Rauner, and realize he didn't seem to do much except lubricate these kind of deals for his buddies... And then you look at some of the new revelations. The Tribune finding that 60 of the 106 top donors got city favors. And then The International Business Times in this absolutely stunning scoop that I can't believe he's getting away with, pointing out that he's using direct voucher payments in City Hall which require no bids and no paper trail to hand out $38 million dollars to donors. And this includes things like 300 -- I'm sorry -- $1.2 million dollars to AT&T in direct voucher payments when they got no direct voucher payments before Rahm Emanuel was [mayor]. And for which their PAC rewarded him with $52,000 in donations. I think were looking at some real innovation in Chicago corruption that will be embarrassing us  -- profoundly -- four or or eight years down the road, if we keep electing this guy.

Kogan: That's the voice of Rick Perlstein who has a tragic story kind of story in this issue of In These Times, which is published here: "How to Sell Off a City." Dick Simpson, talk about that, you've read the piece.

Simpson: I have read the piece. In fact, Rick,we want to try to incorporate it in in our next edition of Twenty-First Century Chicago. Yes, I thought it was a very well-researched piece. It had details about the intersection between the private campaign contributors and simply the large corporations. It fits well with the Tribune piece about two weeks ago that listed all of the favors Rahm has done for the people that indeed are his campaign contributors. But it's more than that, it's a sense that there's a sort of elite that are sharing back-and-forth power and money in Chicago, that goes beyond the individual.

Perlstein: Yeah and for Dick and Rick, I want to point this out. At least under the old forms of patronage, of you know, the kind of jobs patronage under the old Daley and pinstripe patronage under the next Daley, at least the money stayed in the city, whether it was in Bridgeport or Lasalle street. Now it's going to the sovereign wealth fund of Abu Dhabi or Aramark headquarters in Philadelphia. And the services that are delivered to return, Aramark which is a services firm, has a terrible record. They take over the janitorial services for CPS and lo and behold parents are forced to go to schools a week before school and cleanup rat dung! And the next thing Aramark does in response is fire a quarter of their work force. That's their response to inadequate services.

Kogan: It is. Rick Perlstein in your voice and you've written this some time ago, but I can still hear the outrage that you feel, and I think anybody who reads this piece will feel it, hang on the phone for a while and when we come back I have two experts who are going to talk to you too, Tom Gradel and Dick Simpson. We're on the phone with Rick Perlstein whose piece is in this month's edition of In These Times titled "How to Sell Off a City." For me, it's a chilling, chilling, chilling piece. So stay tuned. We'll come back to After Hours. This me Rick Kogan.

I'm in the studio with the Tom Gradel and Dick Simpson who have collaborated on a book called Corrupt Illinois: Patronage, Cronyism and Criminality. And it just so happens on the phone is Rick Perlstein who has a fascinating (but what a lot of people -- I posted this on Facebook and a lot of people just reacting to it saying "frightening and fascinating") it's titled "How To Sell Off a City. Welcome to Rahm Emanuel's Chicago, the privatized metropolis of the future." Rick,the argument that he and everybody else would make is "Oh we're broke so we have to do this." That argument does not wash with you does it?

Rick Perlstein: It most certainly does not. First, the TIF issue. No one knows where the $1.7 billion in uncommitted TIF money is sitting, what it's going to be used for, all the rest. The fact of the matter is that you look at something like the school closings,  they're just not reliable when it comes to how they're spending money, and what the budget situation is. I mean, WBEZ did this absolute stunning report on eight serially different reasons why they're closing fifty schools, and each one of them turned out to be a lie at worst and a misperception at best: you know the schools are undercrowded, the schools are overcrowded etc. etc. etc.  So you know, there's just not enough transparency for them to be able to make the claim. I mean, Rahm Emanuel claims to be running this transparent administration but when International Business Times asks them about these direct voucher payments and where they go for, they gave them absolutely nothing! I've sat in that studio where you are right now and one of your colleagues at WGN told me that when he interviewed Rahm Emanuel, one of his press secretaries was sitting next to him, the interviewer, and telling him what questions to ask. So how can we even trust this guy when it comes to a dollar or a dime or a penny?

Kogan: Dick and Tom, react to that. What are your thoughts on this notion of transparency in the Emanuel --

Dick Simpson: The Emanuel administration has dumped a lot of information out like a fire-hose into the Internet but that doesn't really interpret the data in a way that's meaningful to the citizens. The TIF is an example. There's more information on TIF than there was, but it doesn't tell you whether it's going to be spent properly. Or another example is the city clerk does indeed put up -- for the last 10 years -- has put up the divided rollcall votes of the city council, but if you want to assemble them in trying to determine how your aldermen voted say with or against Emanuel in the last three and half years you have to spend thirty, forty, or fifty hours to do it for the 67 rollcall votes.

Kogan: Rick Perlstein, talk to me for a moment about the charter school operators.

Perlstein: Well I mean when it comes to UNO, the United Neighborhood Association, we're just talking about the new boss is the same as the old boss. Basically Castro is giving his family members  these contracts. Just like what happened in the good old days under Papa Daley. And we have no evidence whatsoever that charter schools work better than neighborhood public schools, and the lack of documentation that they're doing better is becoming more obvious all the time. And the only answer you can reach for is that it's creating basically a new class of sort of teddy plutocrats who want to run the education system in the city of Chicago, and exploiting the children to do so. Just like they're exploiting the preschool kids with these social impact bonds which basically use three and four year old kids as collateral for money that they're putting out the door to investment banks.

Kogan: Whew. What about Deborah Quazzo? You mention her prominently in your piece.

Perlstein: Why isn't she a household name in Chicago? No one knows who she is. Basically for our listeners out there we're talking about the seven member school board. One of the members of the school board runs an investment company that only invests in companies that make money when functions of public school systems are privatized. I mean she literally is in a position to write herself checks. And the evidence seems to suggest that that's what she's done. Companies that she is invested in I think increased their billing to Chicago Public Schools three or four times. A lot of these new contracts are for $24,999 because $25,000 or more requires some sort of accounting for how the money is spent. And she has recused herself from no school board decisions including ones she has a direct financial stake in.

Tom Gradel: I just want to say that is a perfect example of non-transparency: you deliberately make the contract so that it's under $25,000 so nobody can check on what they're for. I mean why does the guy claim he is transparent?

Kogan: Rick Perlstein, do think Rahm Emanuel -- you do say that he is sort of gliding toward reelection. Do you think he will get the 50% + 1 that he needs with this field?

Perlstein: You know, Barack Obama's visit to the city. Has that happened yet?

Kogan: No.

Perlstein: Unfortunately I'm in San Fransciso where it's 70 degrees.

Kogan: No, Thursday, five days before the election.

Perlstein: Barack Obama, who is by the way one of the big legislative supporters of housing privatization down in Springfield, coming to Chicago to "not campaign for him" might just put him over the top. And like I say, Chicagoans might really come to regret that in the years to come. There is going to be a big humiliation coming when people catch up to the kind of stuff he's up to.

Kogan: Rick Perlstein this is one of the most compelling articles I've read sometime "How To Sell Off a City. Welcome to Rahm Emanuel's Chicago, the privatized metropolis of the future." It is in this month's In These Times. Rick I can't thank you enough for coming on. Keep at it pal. And the next time you're around come on in the studio we will talk at length.

Perlstein: Anytime brother. Cheers.

Kogan: Thank you. Thanks Rick.

A "WCopyFind" comparison between the New York Times and Max Blumenthal

I used a freeware program called WCopyFind to find exact phrase matches between Max Blumenthal's writing in Salon and the New York Times.



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Interview with President Sadat on FOIA

Interview with Sadat of Egypt from FOIA on CIA website

http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1821105/FBIS197710.pdf
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Page 1
R, 2VED FO
(L 4C A HI
LL
IONS DIVISION AR 70-14 13NOV2
FBIS -MEA -77-205
Tuesday
25 October 1977
Vol V No 205 Supp 13
Ml@E.E EAST &
TEXT OF AS-SADA T'S OCTOBER ANNIVERSARY INTER VIEW
IFBSIFOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
I.
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-ROVED--OR-RELEASE CIA-HISTOfRCAL- COLLECTIONS DIVSION-A-70-4-3NV2-1
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1
p
TEXT C' AS-SADAT'S OCTOBER ANNIVERSARY INTERVIEW
JN062200Y Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 1915 GMT 6 Oct 77 JN/NC
[Interview given 6 October by President Muhammad Anwar as-Sadat to Mrs Himmat Mustafa
of the Egyptian television on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the October
war--recorded]
'[Text] [Question] History will certainly pause for a long time before the 6 October
war as a turning point in the contemporary history of Egypt and the surrounding at±ea.
Recording facts and teaching them to our modern generation is a matter worthy of
attention and interest. Furthermore, we should benefit from the great October victory,
which in the opinion of the military establishments all over the world--East and West--
was a military triumph and a historic turning point in modern warfare techniques. We
are filled with pride as we forget the sad days, the humiliation and the feeling of
the inability to resist defeat when the Israeli soldiers and flag were on the banks
of the canal facing our forces. We even believed all the allegations the enemy made
about us, as if defeat had been imposed on us forever. But let us now live the
movements of our great victory with the leader 6f that great victory. On our national
occasions, we always pause to study the course of our struggle and make it an oppor-
tunity to further clarify vision. Gentlemen, we have here the leader of victory the
man of Egypt, President Muhammad Anwar as-Sadat. Happy Holiday, Mr President.
[Answer] Happy holiday to you all.
[Question] This is the first time, Mr President, you are meeting directly with the
great people of Egypt, who areavery proud of-the October victory; in which all age
groups participated. The- Egypti~anpeople'arestili'iingte ints
of this
victory and exploiting 'its" results. Asyou'havealiays do, :Mr President, on such
great national occasions ;
yefr6o&
that g -'
l i n
a
a
events
because
this will helpmthe futI
"sz
ourn
exlaining all events
because this will help us"""to furtkier utie-
our_,fn
orie~.or the .enefit of our
people. With your permission, Mr President,. we.would..like.tostart .with the period
that was lived by all age, groups--the .period..of the post-1967 defeat--from the
military standpoint.
[Answer] In the name of God, I was overwhelmed with joy in those days which are
remembered and which will continue to. be remembered for .generations and centuries
to come. They will continue to leave their impact -on the world, not only on our
area, or on the Middle East or the Third World, but on the whole world. People
record events abroad because they always depend on the scientific method. Therefore,
they are now saying that the situation in the pre-October
1973 world was completely
different from that of the, post-October world. World analysts admit this. The
pre-October world was a world different from that
of the post-October world. You are
trying to take me back to the days which we experienced after the 5 June 1967 defeat.
Indeed these were some of the most difficult days I have ever experienced. I might
go back to the few days that preceded 5 June, specifically Friday, 2 June.
After President Jamal t
Abd an-Nasir, may his soul rest in peace, made the decision-
to close the Straits of Tiran in May 1967, we used to go daily to the armed forces
general command, that is, from 24 or 25 May 1967 to Friday, 2 June. We went to the
armed forces general command every night.
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2
I attended all these meetings up to 2 June. Perhaps some of my brothers of the
Revolution Command Council attended some of these meetings and did not attend some
others. However, as far as I am concerned, I attended all these meetings, which con-
tinued, as I said, from 24 or 25 May to Friday, 2 June. Every meeting was attended
by all the commanders. 'Abd al-Hakim 'Amir, may his soul rest in peace, was the deputy
supreme commander of the armed forces and was assuming the tasks of commander in chief
of the armed forces. All chiefs of branches and commanders of formations attended the
meetings, including the commander of the naval corps, the commander of the air force,
the chief of intelligence, the commander of the front and the chief of staff of the
p !
front. The chief of staff of the front at that time was Marshal Ahmad Isma'il, may
his soul rest in peace. The commander of the front was Lieutenant General Murtaja.
Every time we sat down with these people for the meeting at night, we were briefed about
the information received, and, accordingly, the plan drawn up was reviewed every now and
then. All those who attended these meetings are still alive.. This is why I have asked
Vice President Husni Mubarak to write-the testimony of all of them when recording history
and facts because they are alive and can talk, and thus we would be placing the facts
{.I
before the people. Afterward., anyone who wants to analyze these facts and draw his own
conclusions can do so. What I advise is using the scientific method. Matters should not
be treated with emotionalism or rashness in which we would be telling stories, pointing
an accusing finger at some, acquitting others. We are in a phase in which we should place
all the facts before our people. After that, scientific analysis should fellow. Those
who will make the analysis should write down their views and there will be various opinions.
~ In the final analysis, it will .be the people who will judge the events that took place
after being informed of the facts and after the scientific method is used in analyzing
these facts.
f ![Question]
All of them are alive?
[Answer] All of them are alive, thank God. All of them recorded that period at the
history committee with Vice President Husni Mubarak.
On that very day, and I am talking about Friday, as the peak of events, why? Because
on Friday, 2 June, we held our last meeting. On this day we went to the general head-
quarters and stayed up. We usually had supper late because we used to stay up late and
then go hone. On Friday, 2 June 1967, all commanders of the branches of the armed forces,
the commander of the front, the chief of-staff of the front and the intelligence director
were present. When I say the commanders of the branches I also mean the air force commander
and the naval force commander.
A new weapon was added to the armed forces. Prior to the October war this weapon existed
only on paper because the world had not entered this stage, namely, the rocket stage.
-
-
The first war in which modern technology and rockets were used was the October war. In
World War II surface-to-air missiles or surface-to-surface missiles were not used in
their developed state, nor were antitank missiles used in this developed manner.
But our war of 1973, as I have said, had military importance for military men throughout
the world in that for the first time various kinds of rockets, surface-to-air, were used.
Missiles are of various types, SAM-1, SAM-2, SAM-3, SAM-6 and SAM-7. There are five
types of surface-to-air missiles, and antitank missiles which have proven very effective
in the missile corps.
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3
Artillery, as known in the world, consisted of guns of various calibers., A gun was
defined by its caliber which is the diameter of the barrel. This time there was no
artillery with known calibers as in past wars. There was rocket artillery. This was
very, very effective.
For this reason I go back to where I began. The branches of the armed forces were the
air force, the naval force and the land forces, but also a fourth weapon was added,
namely, rockets, which had become one of the weapons of the armed forces. Certain
armies, perhaps of certain big powers, are still
carrying out tests because they have
not fought with such weapons up to now. We have done so, particularly during the war
of attrition and after that period and then in the 1973 war.
All the branches of the armed forces were present. There was no missile commander on
2 June because the missiles were still part of the artillery corps.
All of us read in the papers today about the reaction that occurred in Israel and about
the fact that the Israeli cabinet said that it will form another nationalist coalition
cabinet and that all Israel is under emergency. We also had information that they were
storing food.
.1
This is similar to what happened on Thursday, 1 June, the day before the Friday I am
speaking about. On Thursday, 1 June, a coalition cabinet was formed and Dayan entered
it as defense minister because he was not a minister in the Eshkol cabinet. Israel
formed a coalition government.
Naturally Israel does not resort to forming such a
cabinet except under exceptional conditions and, as they said, an emergency situation
4
that concerns the whole country. On Thursday, 1 June, a coalition government of all
parties was formed. When we met on Friday, Jamal, may God have mercy on his soul,
began the meeting by saying: Friends, a coalition government was formed yesterday and
Dayan entered it as defense minister. All of us know Defense Minister Dayan. Weizman,
who is agriculture minister in the present cabinet, was in the army at that time'. Weizman
had a definite stand at that time. Eshkol was afraid of the war and was hesitant.
Weizman went to Eshkol in those days. Weizman is from the bloc of the "Likud extremists."
Weizman went to Eshkol, removed his rank insignia and threw them' away. He then told
Eshkol: "Either you go to war or I will resign and go home." In fact; the matter was
not just taking away rank but a threat because all of us know that a military establish-
ment rules Israel.
Had Eshkol not approved the war at that time, a-military intervention would certainly
have taken place, namely, a military coup as in other countries, and the military would
have taken over power to wage the war.
I am sorry to mention all these details, but
they are bound to make the picture clear.. On Friday, 2 June, President Jamal 1
Abd-
an-Nasir, may God have mercy upon him, said that the coalition government 'had been
formed with Dayan and therefore a battle would take place. The battle had been ahead
of us ever since the closure of the -strait during the last 10 days of May.
That was clear and we took it into consideration, particularly as far as the military
was concerned. Jamal said that the government was formed yesterday and that there was
a war ahead of us. This war might break outi either tomorrow, Friday, 2 June, or
Saturday; 3 June, or Sunday, 4 June, or Monday, 5 June, at the latest. I say this be-
cause -I was present at the meeting and Jamal is dead. Facts should be placed before
the people. Immediately after this, Jamal said: The first strike will be dealt against
the air force. He said this to Sidqi.
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Page 5
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PP : ED FOR RELEASE CIA HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS DIVISION AR 70-14 13NOV201
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4
-;
[Question) Were these based on assessments or information?
[Answer) Monday. [as heard) Because from the 1956 battle, it was clear that the Israelis
refused to enter the war at the request of Mollet and Eden until Ben-urion, the prime
minister, secretly visited France. A secret meeting was held to plan for striking at the
Egyptian Air Force and for putting an umbrella over Israel comprised of the British and
French Air Force, because Ben-Gurion wanted to protect his country.
Furthermore, certain units of the British and French fleets
in the eastern part of the
Mediterranean had actually participated with Israel, for the sake of protecting it. How-
ever, some of these units attacked and shelled the Egyptian township of Rafah. [power
failure announced, music played for 2 minutes]'
That was not the only thing. Ben-Gurion sought their help to protect Israel's
airspace
with an umbrella. The British and French air forces actually provided this umbrella.
Units of the British and French fleets also participated. All these are historic facts,
recorded in books. They are not guesses, All this happened and is recorded. The fleet
bombarded the Egyptian town of Rafah, where forces were stationed at that time. The
bombardment aimed at facilitating the Israeli operation
to enter Sinai.
Jamal told Sidqi (Mahmud, former air force commander) that the first strike would be
against the air force. Sidgi swiftly grasped the situation and said: Your Excellency,
we have thought of this and the first strike will not cause us more than 10 percent damage.
After President Jamal had explained the facts of the situation to the leaders and that
the war was imminent either on Saturday or Sunday or Monday, at the latest, we started
'
i'
to study plans, in accordance with military customs throughout the world, including all
civilized countries.
Egypt today is a civilized country. It has been civilized for 7,000 years. At that
time there was a government on the banks of the Nile. The rest of the world lived in
caves and in trees.
In every civilized country with military traditions, the president of the republic,
the supreme commander, of the armed forces, must approve the plan,
in accordance with the
constitution.
The commander in chief must subsequently assume the responsibility of implementing this
plan. This, of course, took place on Friday night, 2 June. That day the plan was dis-
cussed completely. The northern position in the direction of Rafah was altered. In the
Sinai campaign, in fact, what happened in 1956 and in
1967 was not a brilliant move on
the part of the Jews. From the military viewpoint, as we have learned and as all the
military men know, any Sinai campaign has rules which must be followed by any would-beo
conqueror. These are matters which areasrelita
han anythin els taDurin ldso
all the invasions across Sinai took the same form despite the developments in the instru-
ments of warfare.
In 1956 the Israeli forces used what is militarily called the plan of the fan. There is
a base which revolves like a fan. The fighting moves from the north and sweeps Sinai.
We used to carry out this operation during our maneuvers in Sinai at the military staff
college.
Every Egyptian Army man knows this, and it is not a mark of Israeli genius.
On 2 June Jamal ordered reinforcements for the northern side, which is the entrance. They
were ordered because there were not enough forces there. The plan was approved and we
had supper with him and went home.
,---------------------------------------------------
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1
Ne did not enter the command again until 5 June. This means we did not go on
Saturday or on Sunday, we went on Monday. Jamal's evaluation was that the battle
would be on Saturday, Sunday, or at the latest Monday. Then some sort of strategic
trickery was practiced by the then U.S. President, Johnson. Johnson at that time
had sold out completely to world Zionism. We all know that he was hostile to us.
No one expected that this Johnson ould become President because Kennedy was young
and full of life. In fact, Kennedy said about himn when he appointed him--but no
need to say 'anything about this because both are dead. Kennedy did not describe him
with good words but with some other words. That was said by President Kennedy, nay
God have mercy upon him. As I said, there is no need to repeat this because both--
Johnson and Kennedy--are dead.
Uhen he took over, Johnson had already sold out completely to the Zionists. He
harassed us in 1965 and told us that he wanted to inspect our armed forces ade our
atomic progress and learn our strength. These were types of harassment. Then we
entered into a stage of confrontation with the United States and the trickery of
Johnson. Following the closure -of the strait, the entire world, including the United
States, was eager-to
understand the events in the area. Everyone was afraid of Egypt's
force, above .ll ;hkol,
Israel's prime minister. As I said, eizman, who is now the
nini:ster of agriculture, was the air force commander.
He was a pilot. He is 'now in
charge of the settlements affairs. He isconsideredthe most extremist member of the
LiUd bloc. Johnson's trickery was part of those things that took place at that time.
As I said, the entire world was eager to realize the events. The entire world, includ-
ing Eskhol, was against the war.
Johnson contacted Jamal and it was agreed that one of the
vice presidents of the
republic should go to the United States on Wednesday, 7 June, dust as it was recorded.
As I said, Johnson had sold out to Zionism.
ie contacted Israel and told them: What
are you waiting for? This is because it was a test of strength between Johnson aid
Jamal Abd an-Nasir. .[announced power failure and music]
Johnson was very shallow in his foreign policy. He was always conducting maneuvers
in Congress. He was very shallow and his era was the worst ever to the extent that
the well-known commentator, Walter Lippmann, said one day that he was leaving the
United States to live in Europe because he could not live in a country with a president
like Johnson. This American commentator actually did leave for Europe. Everyone knows
that Johnson did not
run for the presidential elections for the second term because of.
American public opinioi..
Johnson had committed a kind of deception. He asked 'Abd an-Masir whether an Egyptian
vice president should be sent to the United States or should he send one to Egypt.
rAbd
an-Nasi said: I will send you one from here and, consequently, they set Wednesday,
7 June as a date. Johnson then asked Israel to end the situation before the Egyptian
vice president arrived.
Accordingly, the Israeli plan was submitted to U.S. President Johnson in the presence
of American intelligence, the CIA and leaders.of the Pentacon, which is the American
military establishment. Johnson asked for their vie-:s and they told him that the plan
Mnas l0-percent sound. Johnson gave it his blessing and they began their attack on
Monday, 5 June.
i'ell, I say it was a lcind of deception by .Johnson. Ho:wever, we had prior knowledge as
proved by the fact that on Friday, 2 June--.and those who attended the session arc all
alive--_Abd an-Nasir said: The war is coming either tomorrow, Saturday, .or Sunday or
Monday, particularly since the coalition government had been formed with Dayan and so on.
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I do not want to talk about 5 June. It is a fact that is hard to bear. However, I
thank God for keeping me alive until I was able to make 5 June--which the world shares
with us--a day of victory and pride after it had been a day of defeat, bitterness and
-I
pain. This is because on 5 June 1975, the entire world participated with me with the
exception of one country--an Arab country. However, the entire world--including
countries from the East, the West, the super and small powers and everyone, the foremost
of whom were all the Arab defense ministers excluding this Arab country--participated
III
with us to make 5 June an anniversary for the second reopening of the Suez Canal--after
more than 100 years--and a day of triumph of peace, humanity and prosperity and simul-
taneously a day of pride for Egypt. This is because the canal was opened by the sons
of Egypt and was dug by our forefathers, many of whom were martyred during the days of
{'
forced labor. The canal was :nationalized by the 23 July Revolution and was opened by
Khadive Isma'il. The entire world participated with me during the second reopening so
as to make the day of sorrows a day of triumph of the Egyptian will.
When the Israelis were on the eastern bank of the canal until October, they were
conceited to the extent that ;they used to say: We control half of the water and you
can reopen the canal, but not before reaching an agreement with us because we control
half of the water and consegqently we must have half of the canal's revenues. You can
not reopen the canal alone. ,.So when my sons in the armed forces received my orders,
they reopened the canal. However, my sons paid the price in blood and martyrdom. It
was a heroic performance by the sons of the armed forces which included the educated,
peasants, workers and every sector of the people. It was the armed forces which entered
and we reopened the canal in '1975 as a symbol of the triumph of the Egyptian will. On
that day I declared: I will reopen the canal and I will rehabilitate the evacuees from
the canal's three towns. If Israel attacks the canal, which was still
within the range
of Israel's artillery, and if Israel attacks the canal or any town along the canal, I
will consider this as an attack on the heart of the republic and not on towns on the
frontline. Since the Israelis were on the eastern bank of the canal, they imagined that
*
jtowns
on the western bank of the canal were part of the frontline. The Israelis thought
Ii
that they could hold these towns hostage so as to strike whenever we did anything. We
evacuated the civilians so as to make it a military front. The 5 June is a triumph of
the Egyptian will. I am proud of what they, who were martyred during the battle, did--
whether in the crossing or in the heroic performance which dismayed the entire world,
above all Israel.
I said that any attack on the canal or the ships in the canal, or on any town along the
canal is an attack on the heart of Egypt and, therefore, I will strike against Israel's
heart. Israel is aware that I have the weapons that can reach the heart of Israel.
This was in 1975.
But 5 June 1967 was hard, hard.
It is very very difficult. I woke up in the morning as usual. We are living in the age
of the small transistor radio. Each of us had a small transistor radio next to his bed'
and when I switched mine on, I heard military statements and heard that Israel had
launched a war. I was confident of the measures we had adopted, culminating in the
session held on Friday, 2 June. As an educated military man, I can say that our plan,
which was approved by the supreme commander of the armed forces, Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir,-
was a sound one. I woke up in the morning and began to hear the communiques.
I
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I began to hear the sound of guns and rockets while I was at the Al-Haram, I said to
myself, they [the Israelis] have fallen in the trap they have set. I did not ohange a
bit of m program for that sad, ill-omened day at all After I got ready, I took my car
and went to the armed Poroes headquarters in A1-Abbasiyah. I was in Al-Hara where my
house is. I took the oar and while I was in Salah Salim street overlooking Nasr City,
I realized the oar oh the Soviet ambassador was directly ahead of me. Naturally the oar
is known because it has the Soviet flag on it and was heading in the same direction as
mine, I said to myself, the Soviet ambassador
is certainly going to the armed forces
command to present eongratuations, because I was confident of the soundness of the action,
of the plan. We reached the armed forces command. The Soviet ambassador entered and I
foliowed. The officer at the command met me and led me to the office of the commander
in chief, +Abd al-Hakim~ 'Amir,
When I entered, I found some of the brothers there. But I did not find the Soviet
ambassador in 'Abd al-Hakim +Amir's room, There is a hall next to 'Abd al-Hakim 'Amir's
office and it seems that they took the Soviet ambassador to the hall and Jamal +Abd
an-Nasir was there in the hall. I did not know this at first, only later when Jamal 'Abd
an-Nair came to us fr. the hall, I entered 'Abd al-Hakim 'Amir's office. I said, good
Smorning Abd al-Hanim. I said that while I was completely calm because I thought that since
the Israelis had done it, well, they will be beaten. I entered and said good morning 'Abd
al-Hadim, My eyes met his as I entered. He was standing behind his desk, not sitting down
He had several telephones and was constantly talking. to the front. He had the telephones
next to him and was holding a phone when
I entered, My eyes met his, His eyes strayed
briefly ana he did nt answer me. After one or two minutes he replied and said: Good
Smorning
Anwar This sight alone was sufficient to cause me some kind of a shock. When
I entered hie office, I was happy and Joyful. As I drove, I had the radio on all the
time. While I was on my ay from Al-Haram, I heard that we had shot down 20 or 30 planes.
O the time I reached the armed
forces command, I had heard that we had shot down some
70 planes. I said to myself: Naturally they will be beaten.
Truthfully I was shocked, Wy? Because of the sight of 'Abd
al-Hakim 'Amir with his eyes
straying when he answered me after a time, I sat on the couch where several of our brothers
were sitting, I heard 'Abd al-Hakim
'Amir completing his instructions to the front. Abd
al-Hakim 'Asir sat down. A little later I asked: What has happened, fellows? Immaediately
I realized from the sight of +AI al-Hakim 'Air
'that something had happened, I asked:
What has happened. They said: The whole air force was hit. The Egyptian Air Force is
i;
finished.
At the 2 June meeting, Jamal +Abd an-Nasir had addressed the air force commander b
saying: Sidqi, the first strike will be against the air force, Moreover a
y name,
back to the Saturday, 3June edition of AL-AAM wl
find on
Meoe of
one who goes
c ol
u mr
a
eo
r
Ar
o
Fa
g t wro o f t h e f r e i n n e w
u
n
t
o England saying that Israel
age war a that the first thing it
will 'do is to strike at theb Egyptian Air Force. This report as published on page 2 of
the Saturday, 3 June, edition of AL-AHRAM, two days before the war,
[Question] What is your Excellency's opinion on this subject?
I.
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(Answer] My opinion? Well, why am I mentioning this? I am mentioning it because it
is a subject which does not need military genius. Even for people unfamiliar with
military science, it was clear that the first strike would be dealt to the air force.
However, I am mentioning all this for one reason only. Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir, who is now
I
with God, said this on Friday evening, 2 June. We must tell all the facts today. The
history of the war is known. It was not Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir alone who said this. No.
This was the conclusion of analysts in England. Ordinary people can also analyze. In
modern warfare, the first thing to be done is to deal a blow to the air force as I did
in October 1973. I made the first strike against the Israeli Air Force by using 222
planes. The first air strike put Israel off balance for 4 days. Meanwhile, my forces,
including tanks and armor, made the crossing. The bridges were set up, although they
were bridges of World War II.
The Russians had bridges which could be set up in
half an hour, but they refused to send them to me until after the operation ended. I
received these bridges after the end of the operations. My sons in Egypt might be happy
to know that when we received the Russian bridges, we devised similar bridges here in
Egypt. Our military plants and engineering corps devised similar bridges. In military
parades, the Russian bridge is exhibited and is followed by a completely identical
Egyptian-made bridge--a bridge which can be set up in half an hour.
However, .I made the crossing in 1973 with bridges which take 6 hours to set up--bridges
which the engineering corps needs 6. hours to set up under air raids. Israel was unable
to put one single bridge out of commission. All that happened was that the commander of
the engineering corps, Hamdi, may his soul rest in peace, died. I have named the tunnel
we are now building after him, because it is located in the same place where the commander
of the engineering corps died on the bridge. The commander of the engineering corps is
the highest rank in the engineering corps. He was supposed to stay behind. However, none
of my armed forces officers stayed behind. None, all of them were ahead of their troops.
They crossed before their men. It was a truly remarkable epic.
Take Sidrak. He was a great commander. In other armies, officers and men march ahead
and occupy territory, then the commanders follow. These are the military rules. This'
II
was not the case with us. Sidrak led his men in the crossing. He died in the crossing
I'
and was awarded the Sinai Star. The Sinai Star is the highest military medal in Egypt.
I requested this from the Peoplers Assembly and it approved my request. The assembly
approved the law for granting this medal.
This medal is granted only to those who rendered
more than distinguished service.
This is why most of those who received the medal are
martyrs. The number of those awarded it was limited so that this military medal will
I
retain its special value. This medal gives privileges in wages and many other things.
[Question ] -Mr President, on this historic occasion, I believe we would like to hear from
you the story of the air strike puzzle.
[Answer] The air strike was not a puzzle. There were many errors. The first error was
that, after the 1956 battle, we insisted that there should be concrete hangars at the
airports to protect the air force. This is done in Israel. It is not new military
theory or genius. We saw hangars every time we photographed .Israeli airfields.
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There were no hangars here. Our planes remained in the open. There were many errors.
Defense of airports in the past followed a certain tradition. We called it the tradi-
tion of independent states. It existed both in the government and in the armed forces
in Egypt. What is the story of the independent states? The air force was an independent
state and the navy was an independent sovereign state.
For this reason, there were guns positioned around the airports to defend against low-
flying aircraft and missiles against aircraft flying at high altitude. Fine. As we
know, the missiles belong to the artillery. The guns around the airports, which are
to intercept low-flying aircraft when they descend to strike at the runways with the
so-called runway bombs to destroy these runways and thus prevent planes from taking
off--as we know every minute counts--actually these guns existed. But why did they
not fire?
In the independent states that existed in the armed forces at the time, the air force
said that the guns should have been under the army general command. The artillery
said they should have been under the artillery command.
They did not reach a solution.
No orders were issued. The Israelis struck and destroyed the runways with runway bombs.
They then destroyed the planes out in the open.
There was gross negligence at the highest levels of responsibility indeed. This is part
of the story. The air strike was not a puzzle. The proof is that whoever goes back
to what AL-AHRAM wrote on 3 June--that is..2 days before the war--will find that on
page 2 of that paper, the page on foreign news, a news report datelined London saying
that Israel would enter the war and that the first thing it would do was to strike at
the Egyptian Air Force.
[Question] Indeed, this is What makes it a puzzle. Because they knew about the air
strike and were informed: Yet the air strike took place.
[Answer] I say there was negligence which goes up to other levels. Some unforgivable
mistakes were .committed by the military. During the 1973 war, I told my sons in the
armed forces: Each of you should implement his plan. Do not be afraid. I support you
and assume full responsibility. No one should be afi'aid of making mistakes. Because
I am sure that any mistakes will be ordinary mistakes resulting from action taken.
Negligence was something else. I would not have allowed negligence. There were cases
of negligence during the war. The persons involved were tried and executed. To me,
negligence is something that cannot be accepted by the military mind even in a modest
military school in Africa. Planes were put in advanced airfields in Sinai only 5 minutes
flying time from Israel. The planes were put in those airfields in rows.
All it would have taken was for an Israeli pilot to hit one plane and the rest would have
been burned. There were many errors. I hope none of those who are finding mistakes
against the 23 July Revolution take that as an example of the revolution.
No, in 1973, Husni Mubarak performed what was more than a miracle. To put it simply and
without going into detail, throughout the 17 days of the war, the air raid warning was
heard only twice in Cairo, each time for 1 or 2 minutes. This was sufficient. Husni
was protecting our skies from the southernmost point in Aswan to the northernmost point
in Alexandria, and from the easternmost point to the westernmost point. He waged the
air battles without giving the Israelis a free hand in Egyptian airspace as happened
in the 5 June 1967 war. He did all this in addition to his strikes on the front.
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I said previously that for the first time in military history, the air force commander
tells other commanders: Commanders of the armies, do you want air force support or not.
I' have reserve pilots. They told him: No thank you.
This.has never happened, even in World War II. There was always conflict between com-
manders, especially between the ground forces and the air forces and between the ground
forces and the navy. They all rely on the air force. Because anyone whether on the
ground or on the sea, wants air cover. When he is facing an attack, he wants to see the
air force ready to protect. The air force is called on to rush support over a vast
territory.
;.
Husni Mubarak saw to it that not a single enemy plane penetrated the 180-km front or
entered Egyptian air space from the southernmost point in Aswan to the northernmost
point in Alexandria, and from the easternmost point to the westernmost point. Even if
an enemy plane managed to penetrate to, strike at our airports, it was forced to drop
its bombs before reaching the airport and flee.
[Question] We are reviewing the 1967 setback. We have not yet come to the October
1973 stage on the occasion of which we are meeting with you today. However, when you
refer to 1967 and point out the reasons for the setback, the greatness of the Egyptians
in 1973 looms high. The present generation has experienced these events. However,
there are still certain vague points concerning the period just after the setback and
the background in which our people and army rebuilt themselves until we entered 1973.
We would like Your Excellency to clarify these points.
.1
[Answer] Concerning myself, I would like to tell a story about this period. The story
reflects everyone's feelings at the time. As I said, I returned on 5 June when I
heard that the air force was completely destroyed. [as heard] I knew why 'Abd al-Hakim
Amir was not looking straight at me when he was talking to me. I sat dumbfounded. A
-i
little later the door of the lounge leading to 'Abd al-Hakim's office opened. Jamal
Abd an-Nasir came out. There was an argument between Jamal and 'Abd al-Hakim. 'Abd
al-Hakim said: Get me the markings of one American plane. Jamal told him: Get me
the tail of a single plane with U.S. markings on it and I will make an announcement.
We should not blame the United States for our mistakes by saying that it was the United
States that struck us. So far, the evidence shows that it was the Israelis who struck.
'Abd al-Hakim wanted to cover up what had actually happened.. He said it was the United
States that struck the Egyptian airports thus provoking the severance of diplomatic
relations. This way the- mistake would be covered.
Jamal then turned to us. I and some of my colleagues were sitting. He said: Gentle-
men, let us leave 'Abd al-Hakim to do his job. Let us go. At that time we were in
'Abd al-Hakim's room. The operations room was under 'Abd al-Hakim's office. We all-
left. On that day, 5 June, I returned home. I did not leave until 4 days later.
On Friday, 9 June, the supreme command of the armed forces issued a statement saying
that the Israelis had crossed to the west bank of the canal. Their crossing to the -
west bank meant that Cairo was the target. I knew from what went on 5-9 June, I knew
that unfortunately our armed forces had been dealt a fatal blow and we no longer had
armed forces. I remained at home 5-9 June. I only contacted 'Abd an-Nasir at his home. I
ceased contacting the army command because on the evening of 5 June, I telephoned and
said: What is the battle line, 'Abd .al-Hakim. He said that the Israelis had reached
Al-'Arish.
,,
~
1*
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When he tells me this, as a military man I understand that the battle is over. There
is something in military affairs called a firm base. Nobody launches an attack or any-
thing else except from a firm base. It is called "firm base" in English. The firm base
of our forces in the Sinai was Al-'Arish. If Al-'Arish falls, I do not need anyone to
tell me what will happen then. This took place on the night of 5 June.
It did not happen in 1956. In 1956, Al-'Arish did not fall on the first, second or third
day. It only fell after the withdrawal of all the Egyptian forces in a sound military
manner, although the Jews were in front of us and the British and French behind us,
However, on 5 June disaster took place. At sunset on 5 June they were in Al-'Arish.
They reached Al-'Arish from the northern door which I spoke about. It does not take a
military genius to know this. Any military man knows that the northern door is the gate -
to Egypt. They turned round fan-wise and came to Al-'Arish. This is what made me say
that at the meeting on Friday, 2 June when 'Abd an-Nasir saw that the forces were weak,
he told them: Strengthen the forces with an armored brigade and another mechanized force.
Unfortunately, the plan was changed after Friday. Instead of having an armored brigade
on the northern door, reinforced by a mechanized force in addition to the ground forces,
that is infantry, artillery, tanks and so forth--this armored brigade and the mechanized
force were withdrawn and the ground forces were left there. The result was that they
were besieged by the Jews inside the fan. The Jews besieged them and continued their
descent leaving our forces to be liquidated later. They reached Al-'Arish at sunset.
Everything is over. Because he tells me that Al-'Arish has fallen, I understand that
the battle is over. I learned this on 5-June. I did not leave the house. Thank God,
myhousehold noticed the state I was in and left me alone. I would get out of bed, go
to my study downstairs, sit there for a while and return to the bedroom. This went on
for 4 days, until Friday, 9 June.
-
On Friday 9 June I heard a statement saying that the Israelis had reached the west bank.
They were on their way to Cairo. Should we sit and wait for them to reach Cairo? No.
I immediately went to the People's Assembly. At the time I was the People's Assembly
speaker. I gathered the members, especially the military ones, and found that they num-
tobere
immedI
asked each one of them to prepare 100-200 persons from his constituency
tocleat
ay. 2 created a center in the assembly to contact the members and
facilitate contact between me and the members to tell them to send their people so as to
begin a popular resistance and fight our battle the way any human being fights who finds
the enemy attacking his country. Could I let them enter the west bank and reach Cairo? No.
I said I will go to meet the Israelis in Ash-Sharqiyah Province because since they were
coming, Ash-Sharqiyah Province would be .the Suez road to Cairo.' They have to be in both
these areas. I said we will go and fight and wage guerrilla warfare with these numbers.
Let us say, for instance, that there were 300 members out of 360 and if each brought
100-200 persons, then it would be a big operation involving thousands to begin a popular
resistance. This is what I thought of. Actually; on Friday I went to the People's
Assembly and then left for 'Abd an-Nasir's house.
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Friday morning, 9 June: I found 'Abd an-Nasir in the study. I said: 'Jamal, what are
*
you doing? I found him oalmly sitting there. He was reading a'paper in front of him
which turned out to be his speech which he made on Friday and whioh he was to make on
7 June at night. I said: .Jamal, what are you doing, sitting like that? He said: What
do you want me to do, Anwar? I said: Get up and we will take you to upper Egypt, We
will begin a popular resistance. We will resist until the last centimeter ofEgyptian
soil is gone. Get up and we will take you to upper Egypt. I do not want you to collapse
because of the first battle. Do you want them to come and see you sitting at home? You
*
.represent
the resistance and the entire 'oountry. Get up and we will take you to upper
Egypt. I told him about what I had done with the People's Assembly members and that I
was on my way to meet the Israelis in Ash-Sharqiyah Province or on the road to Suez. We
will fight them wherever they come from,
As a matter of fact, I used to say it would be better for me to die fighting my'battle
instead of having them come to my house in Cairo. Thus I did what I have said.
I asked Jamal: What are you doing? He said: I am revising the speech which I will
deliver at 1900 today. I said: I know that you said you will deliver a speech at 1900.
Did you or did you not hear the statement issued by the command? He said: I heard it.
I told him:. The Jews have reached the west bank. This means that they are coming. You
are taking the situation too calmly. I am telling you get up and let us take you to
upper Egypt and begin a resistance. He said: They have not reached the west bank, Anwar.
I told him: I heard the statement with my own ears. He said: I heard it like you and
asked the command. It turns out that the nerves of the people in the command have collapsec
What is the story? The story is that while some of our officer sons who were withdrawing
. from the Sinai crossed the canal at Ismailia and landed on the'west bank they found the
Jews had arrived on the east. [as heard] Some of our officers--who reject this talk
because the fact is that the armed forces were wrong and this is not their performance
because we have 1973--when one of these officers saw the Jews on the west bank before
him, he became excited. He set up his mortar and opened fire on the Jews on the east
bank.
[as heard] The Jews quickly gave their signal. The Israeli Air Force came and
struck at a paint factory in Ismailia west of the canal. B -the way, this paint factory
became part of the Canal University area this year and forms a landmark of the Canal
University in Ismailia.
[Question] History changes?
[Answer] Yes. 'Abd an-Nasir said: Never. If you ask me, they never landed on the
west bank or anything else. When I inquired I found out that an Egyptian officer of our
sons became excited when he saw them on the east bank. He opened mortar fire on them.
They signaled and summoned the air force which struck the factory. They intended this as
a kind of retaliatory action.
He then told me: God, did you believe the story that they landed on the west bank. How?
Could they come and enter the densely populated areas? He said to me, no. I said I
heard the statement from the command. In fact I, like you, know that they cannot come at
all into the densely populated areas in the delta. To make it easier for the people to
understand we will remember that the Jews tried in the breach [meaning the Deversoir
bulge] seize Suez or Ismailia or only Suez.
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Despite the fact that the population of the two towns had been evacuated, the Jews could
not seize them. They concentrated on Suez with a view to seizing it so as to exploit
its name because the canal is international. At the time they wanted something to raise
their morale. Thus they concentrated on it. Thirteen of their tanks were hit at the
approaches to Suez. Two sneaked in together with one vehicle and 32 men. The people
of Suez, of whom only about 5,000 were left in the town after all the others had been
evacuated, got hold of them. Town fighting is not easy.
I said to him: By God, this is what I heard in the military communique. He was quite
aware. He had started to be quite aware of the trick Johnson had played on him. He
said to me: By God, this battle is intended for me personally, Anwar. East of the canal
is the final line drawn for their advance because they do not know at all how to deal
with the densely populated areas here. This line is drawn up for them because it would.
be sufficient for them to reach the east bank of the canal to slap me personally. They
have actually slapped me. It's that simple.
All right, what will you say in the statement this evening, Jamal?
He told me: I will step down.
I stayed with him a little and then I returned to the People's Assembly. I sat in my
office until he delivered the statement. Then the operation began in which all the
people came out to the point where nobody could move from one place to another because
the streets were filled .by 2-3 million people. They marched on the People's Assembly
and 'Abd an-Nasir's residence. After that and after the return of Jamal, you ask me
what then so as to give an idea of how a person can take that catastrophe. I returned
from the People's Assembly on the 10th. I'did not go home on the night of 9-10 October
because it was impossible. The clamoring millions were in the streets and they did not
go away until noon the following day, the 10th. I also walked back then after 'Abd an-
Nasir's return. I arrived at home, remained there and, did not go out for 21 days. I
did not even speak to my children. I am happy because they truly understood and respected
this.
During these 21 days and just like the other 4 days from 5 to 9 June, I used to go down
to my study at home and then back up to my bedroom. I was unable to analyze what had
happened and why. No, I could not analyze it, truly. After 20 days of sitting there,
reading was difficult so I turned to writing. Writing calmed me down. I sat down and
wrote what happened so as to analyze it. Is Israel superior to us militarily? Are
Israeli arms modern and ours outdated? Did any military surprises occur. during the
battle and our. sons were unable to deal with them? These were my analyses and writings.
As for the Isreali psychological propaganda, they were skilled at it. They seized the
opportunity and whom did they concentrate on?
On Egypt, because it is the big force.
They concentrated on Egypt and as a result Dayan lost control of himself after the
October war. We triumphed and did even more. As part of the psychological warfare,
Dayan simply said that the Israeli soldier is invincible and that the Egyptians do not
fight. He said to. the effect that if you ask me to say in sequence who fought, I will
say the forces which fought are: 1. The Jordanian forces and 2. Syria. Thereafter,
and a long way after them, comes Egypt because it did not demonstrate performance or
soldiering. This talk cost him very dearly later. God willed that on that' day Dayan
should say: I am sitting by the telephone waiting for the Arabs to contact me.
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Dayan is fond of appearances. The propaganda referred to him as Dayan, a defense min-
ister and Rommel's successor as the desert fox, and he-personally loves such propaganda
very much. He was thus sitting by the telephone. All right. This talk cost him
dearly. He is finished forever. He did not make a comeback even if he is a foreign
minister. Wherever he goes, the families, the daughters and wives of the soldiers who
died come out. No one can have an idea of the kind of curses hurled. He is finished
for good. Why?
(Question] Do you think he can forget the black Monday, the black Monday of the tanks?
[Answer] Black Monday of the tanks? He will not forget it. He will also not forget
the fourth day. Monday was the third day. The fourth day was Tuesday. The battle
took place on Saturday. On Tuesday he stood opposite the Egyptian front with all
foreign correspondents. As usual they brought foreign correspondents to showthem
their victories and our disappointment. They thought this time would be the same as
in the past.. He stood directly before the Egyptian front and behind the Israeli forces,
wept in front of the foreign correspondents and made his well-known remark: "We cannot
move the Egyptians 2 inches and the road to Tel Aviv is open. " He returned from the
Sinai to Tel Aviv in front of the foreign correspondents to speak over the radio. Golda
Meir came to: him and said we have had enough demoralization; do not destroy the morale
we have remaining in the country.
(Question] This is a great comparison.
(Answer] We began a new page and man began to feel psychologically at ease.
[Question] Dayan's stand now and then?
[Answer] Undoubtedly, the same thing happened when he spoke at the rallies prepared
for him which he, young men and students attended. On the day of victory he said our
generation expanded the Israeli border from Al-Qantarahto Al-Qunaytirah, which is a
-
play on words. This is true. Our Al-Qantarah in the east was in their hands and
Syria's Al-Qunaytirah was also in their hands. Dayan told them we have expanded to
between Al-Qantarah and Al-Qunaytirah and you are the generation who must complete
Israel's mission, that is, to take it from the Nile to the Euphrates. This is the
reason why later I told 'Abd an-Nasir, Minister of War General Fawzi and 'Abd al-Mun'im
Riyad, may God have mercy on his soul--Fawzi is still alive and Riyad died--I told
them that I was going to enter Al-Qantarah. I did not imagine that 'Abd an-Nasir was
going to die. I told them that when the battle begins I will go to Al-Qantarah and
enter the battle in: the east. This is because I wanted to say to Dayan: You cannot
keep Al-Qantarah or say that your borders run from Al-Qantarah to Al-Qunaytirah. No,
I was confident of this.
'Abd an-Nasir died and I became president. I was unable to fight the battle although
I wanted to like any other soldier.' To me there was a feeling of revenge. I could
not give up revenge. The strange thing is that on 5 June 1973 the Israelis were in
Al-Qantarah in the east. The "battle began after well over 2 months. On 5 June I
stood in our position opposite Al-Qantarah with Field Marshal Isma'il. I said to him:
Isma'il, who is going to conduct the Al-Qantarah battle? He said: Fu'ad Ghali. I
said: Bring him here. Fu'ad came to our position. Ours was not only a defensive
position, but also a position preparing for an offensive.
When I appointed Isma'il I
asked him to reassess the defensive plan, insure its security and simultaneously make
preparations for the attack.
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The offensive and its preparations required a long time as well as many other things.
All this was done and the Israelis did not perceive anything, but they perceived....
[interviewer interrupts]
[Question] They were on the other bank?
[Answer] i remained standing. I had Fu'ad Ghali brought while I was standing. Our
position with the offensive preparations commanded the Sinai because we were able to
observe over a distance of 10 km. We built these positions because the previous minis-
cer regrreceded
to build them. I consider this to be treason. Isma'il
came and corrected all of this. I.was standing in that position and looking at the
Sinai. I was able to see 10 km. The Jews knew that on 5 June I would be on the front.
When I stood at any of these sites the upper half of my body was clearly visible. The
Jews would quickly move and stand up. They would see me and Fu'ad Ghali.. I asked
him to explain to me the battle on the ground. I told him that I was going to fight
this battle as if 'Abd an-Nasir were alive.. He said: Yes Iknow. I said: Tell me your
topographic representationm Oneago. I know everything about the plan, particularly
to o r p i e rsentation.o
tOnetl fi l w t age h the plan is presenting a topographic repre-
sentation of the battlefield with all the staff. attending. In this representation,
I
which is exactly the same as is what, is going to
happen, but on a small scale, one
would ask about where he would go, what his first stages were going to be and where
the battlefield is going to be.ggontobadwhr
I said to Fu'ad: Tell me here so as to be reassured about the Al-Qantarah battle. He
told me and the Jews saw me. They did not believe that my visit to the front on 5
June 197 was to give'the final orders of the plan and to hear the plans of each com-
mander on the spot. I wanted the staff to say what you see is called so and so, the
range is o and so and the time is so and so. I wanted the timing down to the minute.
[Question) That occurred at a time when no one in the world, not even in Egypt,
*expected
that war might break out?gy'
[Answer] Regrettably, I was not concerned about the world. What actually disturbed
me here in the Arab nation were the writers and journalists who thought they were
analysts. I was disturbed by their writings and the infection that came to Cairo from
Beirut. The journalists began their wave of pessimism which I considered at one time
*
to be treason, not pessimism.
Because if I said it is hopeless and wrote in my newspapers to my armed forces and
Peopleythat the crossing is hopeless and we cannot achieve anything, I would be
-
destroying the entity of a whole people. Incidentally, I regret to say that the
Russians also participated in this campaign. The chief Soviet expert who was here
before I expelled the Russian experts in 1972 was telling this to Ahmad Isma'il,
before he too was expelled from the army. I brought Ahmad Isma'il back to the army
after he had been pensioned off and expelled from the armed forces. The chief Russian
exprtwa the iat
to stay here. He talked to Ahmad I-smail. After that I expelled
banklo the
can experts. The chief Russian expert went.-to the front and to the western
bank of the canal. After seeing things there, he told Ahmad Isma'il: You will need
an atomic bomb to cross, nothing less than an atomic bomb. With the positions and
things I see in front of me, including the Bar-Lev line, you will need an atomic bomb
to cross.
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This is recorded, furthermore, in order to undermine our morale to prevent us from
taking any sort of action, they used in the statement which was issued after the first
detente meeting in Moscow in 1972; "military relaxation" [in the Middle East]. They
meant, and they do not deny it, to tell us: Beware of the battle. Do not ever enter
into battle.
They had no confidence in us and they did not want to engage in a dispute with the Unite
States if a war broke out. Simply and plainly speaking, they told us we should not go
to war.
I have here--I mean with the commander of the air force and with their own signatures--
the Russian assessment. According to their assessment, the Egyptian Air Force would
lose 60 percent of its strength in the first strike and we would achieve a maximum of
30 percent in results. This means that if we sent 100 planes, we would lose 60 and
would only score one third or less hits on the targets. Well, what did happen in 1973?
[Question] Mr President, we have not yet reached the point of the 1973 war. We want
to tackle the subject from a specific standpoint according to the sequence of events,
with Your Excellency's permission, if you do not mind.
[Answer) The events are all interlocked in my mind, one with the other.
[Question] We have reached the point of discussing the 1967 setback. It was a tragedy
for the country and for the entire area. Did we pull ourselves together after that?
[Answer] Well, you want to take me back. Never mind. As I said, I am writing and I
will write about what did happen. Why? For 21 days my wife used to go to the hospitals
to visit the wounded. The truth is that in the 1967 and the 1973 wars, Egyptian women
acted according to the highest standards of shouldering genuine responsibility. It did
not occur to anyone that women would act .with such concern. The women were in hospitals
with our sons and the wounded. They also served as nurses. This was done in 1967, not
just in 1973. My wife used to go out to hospitals and come back late in the day to
tell me what she saw, particularly in Al-Ma'adi hospital. Our wounded officers were
excited. One of our sons in Ismailia set up his mortar and began to shoot at the
Israelis in the east bank. In Al-Ma'adi hospital, the wounded became hysterical every
I
time they heard the sound of a plane. They used to run out of control and say: We
want to fight. We want to die.
Every time they heard a plane, they wouldrecall what had happened.. Then they developed
the feeling that they were not given a chance to fight. This brought on hysteria. They
said: We want to fight. We want to die. In Al-Matadi hospitalts psychiatric section,
a tragedy involving one of these sons of ours took place. I was hearing all this and
collapsing further. What has happened? I know that our sons have been like this all
their lives. I am an armed forces officer to start with and I have not forgotten and
will never forget that period. It is true that I stayed outside the armed forces for
29 and 1/2 years, but this does not mean that I do not know what our armed forces are
like.
On the 20th day after the war, my wife told me that the tank officers who waged the
7 June battle in Sinai were at Al-Ma'adi hospital. She saw them and saw their
commander. The commander of the brigade was Maj Gen Kamal Hasan 'Ali. She asked them
what had happened on the seventh. My assessment was that we suffered the tragedy on
5 June--our strong base had collapsed and the operation was over.
I
_
_ _ --
,
--.
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On 7 June, there was an armored brigade in the middle of Sinai under the command of
Maj Gen Kamal Hasan t
Ali. On 8 June, newspapers quoted a statement by Dayan saying
that the Egyptians carried out a counteroffensive and would have succeeded in it had
it not been for the intervention of the Israeli Air Force and tanks, and so forth.
Using the tactics of psychological warfare and propaganda, Israel inflated the operation
to assert the efficiency of its military performance while in fact there was no military
-
I
action in 1967. To be frank, no. What di'd happen was that we withdrew with great
bitterness and disappointment and Israel did not fight at all in the 1967. Israel did
not find anybody to fight because our forces were dispersed. I read what was written
in those days. Of course I read on 8 June that there was a counterattack by tanks in
Sinai. But my wife came and told me this. For 20 days, I stayed in a state of silence
and was analyzing things. This almost consumed me from within. I died a hundred times
every day.
I immediately went to the Al-Ma'adi hospital and enquired about the men of the brigade
who had carried out the counterattack. The hospital officials told me they were there,
including the commander and the officers. They also told me that two young officers had
to be operated on because of shrapnel woulds in their heads. The officials told me
that they would operate on them tomorrow and that there was nothing to worry about because
the operations were minor. I said OK, but I have to come tomorrow to see the commander
and the officers before they are operated on.
Next day, I went to the hospital and asked for the brigade commander Kamal Hasan 'Ali.
I found him there with a rocket fragment in his side. I knew Kamal. I asked him: Did
you wage the battle on the 7th? He said, yes, I was a commander of an armored brigade
there. I said: My Son, I have been trying for the past 20 days to determine whether
Israel has waged a vicious psychological war. Is this true: Were you surprised by
anything? Were you unaware of the sophisticated weapons? He said: Not at all. I
asked him: Was Israel's performance legendary? Not at all, he replied. I asked him:
Were the Israeli tanks superior to yours? Not at all., he replied. I asked him: Was
your training not good enough to qualify you for waging a battle? He said: Not at all.
I listened to all these answers with astonishment. I than asked him to tell me the
whole story.
He said: "I was a commander of an armored brigade in the central Sinai. I was in-
structed on 5, 6 and 7 June to move from posts in (Kortella) to Al-'Arish and back to
central Sinai." They were aimless movements. He said: "I was carrying out these moves
because the air force was hit on 5 June. I was executing every single order I received."
It was clear on 7 June that our air force was completely disabled and the the Israeli
Air Force was monopolizing the sky.
Despite the superiority of the Israeli Air Force and repeated air strikes for 3 days,
this brigade commander had only lost 20 tanks of his brigade. Our brigade comprises
100 tanks. He lost 20, but he shot down 5 Israeli planes with his antiaircraft guns
because the planes were flying-low to hit the tanks. What I mean here is that Kamal
shot down more planes in Sinai than our missiles did in Cairo. Every -armored brigade, in
addition to the 100 tanks, includes antiaircraft guns. It is considered one complete
unit in every part of the world. The armored brigade is the strongest unit that can
play an effective role in the battle.
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I asked Brigade Commander Kamal Hasan tAli: "What happened?" He said; "There were no
more instructions on 7 June. The tanks carried on their actions." From the military
.
standpoint, tanks oantinue their actions when other forces are out of aotion. The tank
can go into a ditch with very little
of it showing. The tank can only be disabled by
-
a direct hit. This is known to every army and our sons are fully aware of it.
He said: "I was taking up positions in my trenches. I was supposed to leave the trenches
for combat at the opportune time." The tank would stay covered inside the trench with its
gun pointing above the trench. He told me: "While I was in my trenches on 7 June, they
confused me. They ordered me to retreat from the (Kortella) and Al-'Arish, They told me
that Al-'Arish was occupied and ordered me to retreat to the central Sinai." They confused
-
I
him.
From the practical standpoint, this is a military mistake. According to international
standards of military professionalism, tanks are not supposed to run on their treads
exoept in the battlefield. Huge tank transport vehicles are supposed to transport the
tanks to the closest spot at the battlefield to spare the tank treads from being worn out.
The orders issued to him usre wrong to start with. It was a military mistake and does not
need military genius to recognize. We know that tank treads should not be worn out during
the trip to the battlefield or in moving from one place to another but should be saved for
combat because during combat the tank might have to cover 1,000 km in hit and run tactics.
Tank treads can be damaged, Moreover, it can cover at least 1,000 km before it suffers any
damage. This is why we like to keep the tank treads intact. The transport vehicles are
supposed to transport the tanks to the closest possible theatre of combat and then come
back, leaving the tanks behind.
He told me they confused him, "After I covered some 1,000 km on the treads, coming and
going and in trenches, I received no further orders, Afterward, while my tanks were in
the trenches, I was surprised by an Israeli Air Force raid and lost 20 tanks." The
. 'Israeli
Air Force had been flying above his brigade since 5 June. He had 80 tanks left.
He also told me: "An Israeli tank column was heading toward me. When they made the air
force strike, our tanks were in their trenches. So they sent their tanks to fight a tank
battle with us because in the first 3 days of the war, they had only destroyed 20 of our
tanks, although they enjoyed superiority in the air. I saw the Israeli tank column heading
toward me ready for combat. Since they were ready for combat, they were spread out."
According to the tank warfare tactics, each tank maintains a distance away from the others.
However, they all had a specific objective and all the tanks were heading toward me. In
that case, there might be an offensive from one flank, a face-to-face offensive, or a
cover-up offensive. The offensive from the flank is the most important. These are tactics
which our tank warfare specialists know and people all over the world know as well.
He .added: "I found the Israeli tank column in front of me ready for combat. They were
ready for battle. I ordered my men to take the tanks out of the trenches, to face the
Israeli tanks and be ready for combat and open fire. As my tanks opened fire firs.t, we
destroyed seven Israeli tanks. The rest of the tanks of the Israeli column withdrew.-
We went after them."
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He and his officers were deeply moved and happy, They went after the Israeli tanks while
realizing that Israel had air superiority. The Israeli tanks withdrew and decided to
destroy the rest of the Egyptian tanks by signalling the air force to come an destroy
them. This was an example of the cooperation between the various Israeli corps and a
lesson for independent states to learn. No one single corps can enter a battle
independently. With a signal from a soldier in the batliedtharfocwllDm
to help in a couple of minutesf
ttlefield, the air force will come
In ur case, all forces are under one single command. Before action, they had to acquire
permission from the air force, and so forth, Of course all this changed in 1973. This
is why our performance in 1973 was very remarkable.
He told me: "We destroyed seven Israeli tanks in the first action." I asked: "I have a
question, Kamal. Was the fire of our tanks effective?" He said: "It was more than
effective
When we fired at the Israeli tanks, we did not just score hits at them.
Because
t
strength of the explosives which our sons are. well trained to fire, the Israeli
i
tanks turned over and were destroyed," When our tanks opened fire, the strength of the
impact turned over the Jewish tanks, which they got rom the Americans
t
'
I asked him: "Was this what really happened?"
He said: "I have here two .unior
second lieutenants who received shrapnel wounds in their
Sheads The are new n the army and graduated recently from the military college. They
are trained according to the highest standa'd in the world, They fought the battle and
received small shrapnel wounds in their heads, They shaved their heads in order to operate
on themr Thank god these were not fatal wounds. I tell you these two officers were with
me and were among those who fought."
I asked: "Well, Kamal, what about these Israeli claims that they suddenly started firing
missiles at you, while their tank columns were attacking you?" He said: "This is part
of the Psyahologial warfare. There was talk that the Israeli tanks retreated, after
which a hail of missiles pounded the Egyptian tanks, They used such tactics of psychological
warfare on the Arabs to persuade them that it is hopeless for them to fight and that they
are as good as dead, There were no missiles or anything of this sort, I am telling Your
Excellency that my tank fire not only scored hits on the Israeli tanks but turned them
over as well,"
I asked: "Did they hit any of your tanks?"
He said: "Not at a2, although in tank Warfare, when one side opens fire, the other side
returns the fire immediately because everyone has his hand on the trigger. They did not
destroy anty ofmy
stank.
On the contrary, they retreated and I went after them,"
I asked: "Then what?"
He said: "They requested air cover, and the air force came before we could dig trenches.
we were still on the surface. The air force hit our tanks one by one and they lost no
time. They hit the ammunition vehicle which we dragged behind us, When the ammunition
exploded, everything nearly exploded as well. Then they hunted down our tanks one by one,"
a"
,.-
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Finally, they hit his tank and he was wounded by shrapnel from one of his tank missiles,
,I!
after whioh he lost consciousness ers woke up to find himself in Al-Ma'adi hospital.
Thus we did not suffer from any military inoompetenos, lack of training, armament,
I'i
ability to maneuver, surprises, or new technology beyond us to absorb, se the philosophical
Arabs in Beirut and Cairo unfortunately tried to say to demoralise the country.
i
I say this talk is enough to Dover the period before 1973 because it explains everything
I want to say or portray of that period.
.
[Question] Before we end our talk about the 1967 war, its history and the statements that
:.I;
have been or will be made by its comsmanders, a political and military appraisal of 1967
Sbeenwar will soon be prepared nsd msade public.
[Answer] The People's Assembly committee has recently issued a decision to form an
investigation commission to look into our 5 June defeat. The appraisal you are talking
about exists in our armed foroes.
(Question] Is it a military appraisal?
[Answer) Yes, we have it in the armed forces and it is under study by the historical
committee in a military sense because this is a basic military question. We must evaluate
every suooessful and unsuccessful battle we fight
and then keep a record to serve as a
lesson for military science.
[Question] We now move to the preparations for the 1973 war.
(Answer] Preparations for 1973 war were many and varied. I do not know where to begin.
[Question] The army began.its reorgariisation, the people began calling for revenge, the
war of attrition started between us and the enemy, the supreme powers imposed military
relaxation on us, the world looked down on us. Then what?
[Answer] This means the beginning came before I became president. We passed through many
stages from June 1967 to the death of 'Abd an-Nasir in September 1970. The first stage
was that of rebuilding our armed forces because, without exaggeration, we had lost our
armed foroea. As 'Abd an-Nasir once said, we had no soldiers left between Suez and Cairo.
There were no armed forces because the army was taken by surprise and the enemy had air
superiority. The most dangerous thing is air superiority or air predominance. We say
superiority when we have some arms left with which to confront the enemy, but predominance
means that one party has completely destroyed the power of the other. They had this air
predominance, so they seriously harmed and dispersed our aimed forces.
However, we have our military traditions without which we could not' have reorganized our
armed foroes.- When the Russians supplied us with arms in June and July to reinforce a
defense line west of ,the canal and in front of Jews on the eastern bank, our training
centers were open 24 hours a day. This is an example of Egypt's power and mobility. An
example of this was the building of SAM 1, 2 and 3 rocket bases, which I am going to discuss
later. This is not confined to the training centers but also to the contractors, workers
and Egyptian civil engineers who achieved a miracle in the real sense of the word. In
40 days they managed to build army positions worth 40 million pounds.
I-
,II
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That is, they constructed bases worth 1 million pounds a day.
All these were designed
and built by Egyptian engineers and workers. These included underground aircraft hangars
built without asking the Russians or anybody else to design a shelter or anything else.
We implemented all these things in the most skilled way.
I can say that in the period between 1967 and the death of 'Abd an-Nasir in 1970 we
passed through many stages and we corrected mistakes. At first, as I have said, we opened
training centers with the aim of quickly forming a military line on the west side of the
canal in front of the Jews on the east side. Behind this line we were able to be at peace
while rebuilding the rest of the armed forces. The one who was in charge of rebuilding
this line from Port Said in the north to Suez in the south, a distance of about 180 km,
was the late Field Marshal Isma'il, may God have mercy on his soul. He was then the
commander of the front. At that time we just called it the front and there was no army.
It was one line stretching from Port Said in the north to south of Suez--a line 180 km
long. The miracle which took place was that in less than 5 months the Russians, as I
said, sent us shipments of arms in June and July and then they stopped. They said: If
you can absorb what we have sent you within a year and 1/2, you will be a great state.
They also treated 'Abd an-Nasir in the same fashion. Why did they have .to treat us like
lI
this? They sent us arms through an airlift and a sea-bridge. Why didn't they continue
their good deed? Two months after the defeat and after they sent us arms and then
stopped, 'Abd an-Nasir was angry. He sent for Tito and told him: Go to the Russians
and tell them that I will not accept being treated like this. I would rather die than
see Israel enter the country. I will not accept this treatment of my requests meeting
with silence. This was in August 1967. They had sent us arms in June and July and then
stopped. Well, continue the favor and send us the arms. They said: If you absorb these
arms in 1 and 1/2 years, you will be a great power, a great country. Training .centers
were open 24 hours a day. The arms were absorbed and introduced into the frontline on
20 November 1967. June, July, August, September and October passed. Within months and
by 20 November all the weapons--the weapons which the Russians said if we could absorb
within a year and 1/2 we would be a great state--were absorbed and in place along the
line. I remember this date clearly because I was the speaker of the People's Assembly
at that time. 'Abd an-Nasir,. as the constitution requires, had to open the Peoplers
Assembly session with a speech. On the basis of the constitution, the People's, Assembly
session should be- opened not later than the third Saturday in November. If the third
Saturday comes and the president does not call the assembly to-meet according to the
constitution, the assembly has the right to convene even against the will of the president
of the republic. This is necessary so no one can rule without the legislative authority.
'Abd an-Nasir was supposed to deliver the opening speech. I told him: Jamal, the
constitutional date for convening the assembly is due. He told me: I am sorry, I cannot
do it. I asked why? Are you going to abolish the assembly? He said: No. First the
line of defense should be established and then I will come to open the assembly session.
But, before doing that I cannot speak the way you would like me to speak. There is a
line to establish and I am building my armed forces behind this line and I am continuing
to resist. I have to tell the people this. But how can I say it when I don't have a
line of defense? You should take this into account. I cannot open the People's Assembly
session before I establish the line of defense.
.
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_~
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The People's Assembly must be able to see, agree with and discuss this matter. Together
Ij
with our brothers who are conversant with the law we agreed on the agenda of the session.
As for the legal date, I had not yet completed the line of defense, namely, before
Saturday, 3 September. There was still work to be done, after I had gone to-the front
I met with Major General Isma'il. In those days, Lieutenant General Isma'il, may God
rest his soul, was a general. I asked him: 'Are you ready, Ahmad? He told me: It
still remains for me. to be prepared before October. I asked him: Are you sure? He
told me: Definitely. We went to the secret headquarters and become acquainted with
his plan. Then we went out and reviewed the line of defense--north from Port Said to
the south of Suez; a distance of 180 km.
I found the people in their proper positions
and the arms I had received fully utilized. They had carried out the battle of Ra's
al-'Ushsh with splendor, the battle of splendor that demonstrated Egypt's strength.
-
The Ra's al-'Ushsh battle took place in July and the setback occurred in June; that is,
the defeat occured in June. In July they carried the battle of Ra's al-'Ushsh, in which
the Jewish supply column proceeded under the protection of tanks on the east bank. Our
sons from the special forces intercepted this column and found themselves confronting
the tanks. They confronted the tanks not with their own tanks, but with their bodies.
They devised the wonderful tactic of striking at the first and last tank.
[Question] Perhaps this was the first hope for the soldiers and the people?
[Answer] No, it concerned the people and raising the soldiers' morale. But as far as
we are concerned, no. We know that... [sentence incomplete]
After I had seen Kamal
Hasan- 'Ali and heard this story from him, my confidence, I know now, returned. That
is, it was not easy to lose this confidence. No, this had indeed raised the morale of
the armed forces. It further boosted their enthusiasm and raised their morale. They
executed a tremendous tactic rith their bodies. The column was advancing and they hit
the first and last tank. The tanks in the middle were caught and our sons immediately
fired on them from a distance of a few'meters and hit them. I know some of those boys;
I want to introduce them to the people.
I know boys among these, Himmat, between 24
and 25 years old and incapacitated forever, because while they were in their prime of
life, 22 or 23 years old, they carried out this operation and their spinal cords were
ff
severed. An injury to the spinal cord incapacitates a human for life.
I,
[Question] Your Excellency the President, we owe it to them to at least tell the people
I
to salute them.
[Answer] While opening the canal on 5 June, they were with me on board the 6 October
destroyer, all of them. In marking any victory, I brought them with me, including those
boys who worked in 1967 and not only those who worked in 1973 because they are all the
sons of the armed forces. These boys are like roses; these boys of mine are like roses.
They are condemned to sitting in a w1heelchair.
[Question] 'These are the ones who raised Egypt's name high.
[Answer] I don't know these people who sit in air-conditioned places, with hot water and
in ivory towers--these people who philosophize and make defeatist appeals. I was very
sad--I will talk about this in the second part--when some intellectuals tried to cast
doubt and got involved in writing a statement. Our sons not only fought the Ra's al-
'Ushsh battle in July; they did greater things also when they sunk the destroyer Elat on
21 October. The sinking of the Elat was a splendid thing, because in the darkest hours
of defeat we changed the world strategy on naval war.
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Since October 1967--4 months after an extremely bitter defeat--there has been a change
in naval strategy. It is recorded in military history that the world strategy of
naval wars has been changed by an Egyptian missile fired by a boat carrying 17 crew
members at a destroyer carrying more than 300 seamen and equipped with the most modern
weapons.
What is the story of the destroyer Elat? Israel possessed two big destroyers, one
called Elat and the other Haifa. Elat was the flower of the Israeli fleet--not the
flower, but the pride of the fleet. It had been built in England.
They did not allow anybody else to make the plans for them or accept the usual plans.
No, they added new plans and introduced the missiles into their plans. This destroyer
had great firepower. We always measure naval vessels on the basis of their firepower.
The aircraft carrier launches planes and is used as an airbase. It is like an air-
field on the ground and its power is measured by the amount of bombs and missiles these
planes can carry. The battleship carries the heaviest guns
and its firepower is great.
The battleship is equipped with high-caliber
guns capable of extreme ranges. Therefore,
it has the biggest firepower. Not many battleships exist in the world today because
modern destroyers are being built. The destroyer, like the battleship, is measured
by its firepower. Israel equipped its destroyer with huge firepower. Israel also
equipped its destroyer with missiles. It had a crew of over 300 men. It was hit by
a boat carrying 17 men. This is the secret of the change in the naval strategy. From
this date, naval strategy has changed. Anyone studying in a military college anywhere
in the world will find that naval strategy changed from this date. There is no more
need for big naval vessels. One can equip a small vessel with long-range missiles and
with a crew of 17 or 20 men instead of 300 men. This small vessel can provide more
firepower than the Elat. A small vessel with two missiles and a 17-man crew proved
that with ohe missile it was possible to wipe out.a destroyer with its huge and
terrifying firepower and missile power and 300 officers and men.
Look at the contradiction. At the peak of defeat and bitterness we were writing world
-"
history, the military history which we wrote again in October. Let us now go back to
*
what we were saying. I. called on the late Ahmad Isma'il at the line. He was the commander
of the line. No one knew about that. Ahmad Isma'il did not just come out of nowhere.
He was-the officer who established the first impregnable line against the Israelis from
Port Said to south of Suez--some 180 km long--and he was the commander of this entire
line. He is the one who carried out the Ra's
al-'Ishsh operation. The destroyer Elat
was attacked on his orders. All this was done by Ahmad Isma'il, who later was dismissed.
The poor man was dismissed and sent home. But I brought him back.
We played a constitutional trick with regard to the convening of the People's Assembly.
We agreed to call the People's Assembly on the latest date specified in the constitution
to meet the next day. In this way, we issued the invitation and met the constitutional
requirement, but the assembly could meet later after the line of defense had been
established. This is what happened, although it was a way to get around a legal knot
I
and this may not appeal to some legal experts. But if the law is not designed to serve
the homeland and the citizens, there would be no need for law just to control us and
to prevent us from ruling ourselves.
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When I went to Isma'il at the time, he told me the line would not be ready before
20 November. After I had seen the line, I telephoned him and he told me that the line
it
would definitely be ready on 21 November. I was glad. I told 'Abd an-Nasir that we
could open the assembly session on 23 November, giving ourselves 21 and 22 November.
I spoke to Isma'il again and he confirmed to me that the line would be ready
on
21 November. I passed the information to Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir.
The People's Assembly session in 1967 began on 23 November 1967 after the establishment
of the line. 'Abd an-Nasir delivered a speech in which he defined three stages. The
first stage was the stage of steadfastness; the second stage was deterrence; and the
third stage was liberation. The man did not admit defeat. Therefore, he had to tell
the country what would happen. He set three stages; steadfastness, deterrence and
liberation.
He delivered the speech.
I think this is sufficient. Let us now look to the stage
after 'Abd an-Nasir's death. Indeed, it was under 'Abd an-Nasir that the state of
steadfastness came. The frontline,
which had been one single line, was divided into
two sectors and two armies. Rach army had its own commander.
Many changes took place.
*
I closely followed up certain things such as graduat ions from our training centers for
troops and arms. It was no longer one front and one line. Each army had a sector and
each army had a commander. Things happened just as 'Abd an-Nasir had planned. We then
began the period of deterrence and the war of attritiom in September
1968. The Israelis
then came up with th Naa' Hamma di affair and started hitting civilian targets.
We
stood fast until 1969 when we began what was called the war of attrition. This went
on from 1969 to 1970 until 'Abd an-Nasir's death--I don't know--sometimes people have
!
premonitions.
One day 'Abd an-Nasir told me to accompany him to the command headquarters. I have not
entered the command headquarters since 5 June. I did not enter it because I honestly
considered it a bad omen, and I-did not launch the war of 1973 suerstitious) by nature.
never launch a war from there.
I don't know--we peasants are Wha toH
by me.
He told me:- Let us go to the command headquarters. I asked: What for? He told me:
3 have gathered the experts and the commanders. OnyAbWa Minister nMuhammad Fawzi,
from the politica. command.
The rest were niitary ianexprtsMattached eah
all the military commenders at the front and the Russian experts attached to each
commander. We eat for 6 hours diuring which we were briefed on what was called the
Plan-2
0 0 . I have spoken about it before. Tis is the defensive plan. In military
science, a line of defense sthoud exist before any offensive operation is undetaken.
The line of defense, west of the canal, should be capable oft rthinkof the territory
operation and backing any attack we want to launch.
One mushd
the trory
before thinking about attacking. The plan meant that we should establish a strong
line of defense which the Israelis, even if they thought of crossing to the west bank
of the canal, could not succeed in overrunning. The line should have been able to
repulse them and then to pursue them. This was the plan. For
6 hours each commander
explained the details of the plan
on the map.
II
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After each commander, the Russian expert attached to him stood up and explained and
confirmed what the commander had said. At the end of the 6 hours, the commanders and the
Russian experts handed 'Abd an-Nasir the complete Defensive Plan 200 and they took
responsibility for nothing lacking in it. 'Abd an-Nasir asked me if I had anything to say,
because he knew he was going to die. There was no one with him except myself. It was as
if he was handing the plan over to me. After that he died, and I took over the office of
the president.
My policy has been clear since my first day in office. I would like to state this very
simply. I say that if we are not serious enough to assume responsibility and make war,
manhood will disappear from Egypt and the Arab nation for many generations to come.
People were aware of this before 'Abd an-Nasir died. - Minister Muhammad Fawzi knew it.
U
I had told him: Fawzi, I am the one who will attack Al-Qantarah and Ash-Sharqiyah.
Make the preparations for the day of attack. I will take over the sector of Al-Qantarah
and Ash-Sharqiyah. My opinion is that manhood and our existence as human beings will
become extinct if we do not carry out our battle, even if we lose it.
This is what some had foolishly cast doubt on.
'Abd an-Nasir died. Before he died, we reached a decision in this hall. Perhaps some
people will ask whether I prefer this place [where the interview was recorded]. Actually
I do prefer it. Why? Because every, fateful decision I took since the beginning of my
<*
term was issued from this hall. This hall also represents something between the village
and the city. I am by nature a villager. I like village life. As I tell my colleagues,
I have had my share of prison and detention--that is to say, walls. I have had my share
i_
and I want to breathe fresh air and see trees. My house in the village is simple. It is
not what the clowns say about it. It is the house of an irrigation inspector. Scores of
such houses exist along the Nile. I saw the house of the irrigation inspector in Asyut.
It is-ten times better than this house. These things are part of the stupidities.
We lived in Al-Qanatir. We spent most of the last year of 'Abd an-Nasir's life here.
I used to tell 'Abd an-Nasir: By God, Jamal I will make things simple. I told him: if
we- were able to take 10 centimeters)and to establish ourselves in them--this is, of
course, for the sake of argument--the situation on the Arab and international levels would
change. The situation of our people would also change.
What did I mean by this? The
director of the French Strategic Studies Institute, the late General Beauvior, came to
see me in Al-Qantarah after the war. He wrote this story. He wrote the fundamental
strategy of this battle. I always said: Jamal, to win 10 centimeters in Sinai and to
establish ourselves in them will change the entire situation and will enable us to launch
any battle we want. This was' the basis of the strategy of the 1973 war. It is as simple
as that. We have complicated military terms, but I like to state things as simply as
possible.
-
When 'Abd an-Nasir died, I was faced with an extraordinary situation. The country was
weak and tired as a result of the past 18 years under 'Abd an-Nasir.
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Himmat, perhaps I once told you that in a conversation with 'Abd an-Nasir I toad him:
I live on my nerves when I am with you. Why? Because he himself was living on his
nerves. He did not pretend. I by nature prefer the quiet and balanced tune that is to
the point. Others like a quick tune. All the time my feelings were with 'Abd an-Nasir.
I'
People have already heard me say this. I told him: Jamal, you have made us all tense.
Even he thought that he had acquired this nervous tension after coming to power. He
asked me about this, and I told him: No. This is your nature, since" you were a lieu-
tenant 19 years ago. I say the country emerging from an 18-year period, from a violent
torrent or a quick pace. The 18 years were tantamount to very quick steps. I, by nature,
-'
cannot work in such an atmosphere. I cannot think or plan in such an atmosphere. I
began to wonder why this was so. Our steps. should be neither very slow nor fast. If
ii
they are slow we lose opportunities. If they are fast we become emotional and tense and
unable to think calmly. This is especially true for me, who does not like a quick pace.
I found the country really weak. So the first thing I did from this hall on 20 December--
that is 2 months after taking power in October--was to issue a law abolishing the
sequestrations on which the centers of power were founded. A few months later, barely
a year, I liquidated the centers of power themselves. . My main aim, as we recall, was
that I begin the battle again. After 6 months, no, I assumed the presidency in October--
November, December, January and February--after the first 4 months of my presidency, I
stood in the Egyptian parliament on 4 February 1971 and presented what has been called
the Egyptian initiative and said: America and Israel, here is the Egyptian initiative
and there is no alternative to it except war. Naturally, they did not consider my words
logical and they did not believe me.
[Himmat Mustafa is heard in the background asking about the initiative] 'Abd an-Nasir
had accepted the Rogers plan before he died. The Rogers plan was based on two points:
first, a withdrawal and second, *a 90-day cease-fire. When 'Abd an-Nasir saw the word
-:"
cease-fire and when the Soviet Union had made him dizzy in Moscow during the visit
-"
which took place 2 months before his death, he accepted the Rogers plan and we began the
-
90-day cease-fire on 8 August 1970. The following month', on 28 September, 'Abd an-Nasir
died. .There was still a month and a half to go .of the period covered in the initiative.
The period was up :in November. I assembled the National Security Council--as.I convened
it last Friday--and we decided to extend the 90 days by another 90 days to end on
4 February 1971. On that day .I made a speech marking the end of the second 90-day period
and said: This is my.initiative. My initiative is that Israel should withdraw from the
east bank. of. the canal up to behind the [Sinai] passes. In return I will open the Suez
Canal and give UN representative Jarring a 6-month period-to act between me and Israel
to find a final solution, because, according to .the first step, the Israelis were to have
withdrawn behind the passes. For 6 months Jarring, the representative of the UN Secretary
General, worked between me and them and at the end of the 6 months Israel was either to
-
have withdrawn or we were to have signed an agreement on an Israeli withdrawal. Naturally,
the Egyptian front is part of the entire Arab territory.. The issue is an indivisible whole,
in particular the Palestinian issue, because, as. is known and, is. clear and as has even
been noted by Carter recently--I am happy.that he has realized this fact because it was .
evident even to West Europe--without solving the Palestinian question there will be no
peace and no solution. The question is not Sinai or the Golan--the problem is the
Palestinian question.
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(Question] It was the biggest international gain for the Arabs.
[Answer] I said in the initiative that in return for an Israeli withdrawal behind the
passes I would open the canal and, in order to achieve all this, I would agree to a
longer period, so long as we were continuing to tackle the question of peace in order
to solve the entire problem, which is that
of the Arabs and Israel. I also said in
the initiative that, following the Israeli withdrawal from the passes, the armed forces
would immediately move from the east bank to the passes and in return for all this we
would restore diplomatic relations with the United States and embark on a new phase.
-I
I was willing to do this because the United States, the Soviet Union and we the Arabs
were all working in the same operation and our relations with the United States should
r
Inot
have remained severed. I presented this initiative 4 months after I became presi-
dent and said that the only alternative to it was war.
I'
Naturally, when Jamal accepted the initiative--although he accepted it very late--and
despite the fact that it contained the word "withdrawal," Israel accepted it because
it was confident that we the Arabs would always say "no, no, no, no." They were taken
*
by surprise when 'Abd an-Nasir kept quiet for a month and a half. It was 21 days after
he returned from the Soviet Union and 1 and 1/2 months after the [Rogers] initiative
*
had been presented that .he accepted the initiative.
When he called their bluff, the Israelis started in on Rogers. First of all they
employed the method with which they got Rogers out of the State Department and then
they brought the initiative to an end. They succeeded in convincing the United States
that we in the west bank (of the Suez Canal] had moved the missiles [sawarikh]. The
west bank is mine and so is the east bank. What crooked logic is this? We had moved
the missiles in the west bank! What empty talk is this? What a shameless thing to say.
It was just an excuse, Israel disturbed the water, because our position was strengthening.
Actually, America withdrew its support for the Rogers initiative as a result of Israeli
pressure. As I have told you, 4 months after I became president, I said here is the
Egyptian initiative and the only alternative to it is war. When I say something,
I
really mean it and you can hear me. Naturally, at that time no one in the entire
world or in Israel believed me. The Israelis believed that we were a dead body, that
there was no hope for Egypt, none, none, none!
Well, 4 months after I became president I presented the Egyptian initiative. Before 6
months had passed I declared that 1971 would be the year of decision and that every-
one must accept this. Naturally, everybody ridiculed me. The Soviet Union ridiculed
me. The United States ridiculed me. The Jews ridiculed me. The Arab philosophers and
the brilliant Arab analysts ridiculed me.
Everybody ridiculed me. I had declared
that if Israel and America did not respond to my initiative in February the battle
would be unavoidable in 1971. I have described the situation I was in then and what
the Soviet Union had done to me in that battle, how it had prevented the weapons from
reaching me and what it had done to me. Despite all this, I said we were going to war.
i
We entered 1972 and.America ridiculed me as it never done before. They said: The
year 1971 had passed, the year which you master, considered the year of decision-
-
Likewise, the philosophers, the renegades, the agents I have here in Egypt and those
who represent Russia--all of them. said: The decisive year has passed and what have
you done?
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I really took a blow, but despite that I did not want to expose the Soviet Union. I
could have told the whole story then. Anyone who reads the minutes of the meetings
of the Egyptian People's Assembly of March 1972 will find me in front of the assembly
slandering all those who were assailing the Soviet Union and saying: Leave the Soviet
Union alone because it is supporting us and giving us weapons and because it is this
and that.
Really, our people in Egypt are not only noble and have a history going back 7,500
years--no, they are the most alert and intelligent people in the world, particularly
their broad base. The educated Egyptians include excellent analysts. However,
regrettably all the elements of deviation come from the educated ones and not from the
popular base. The broad popular base represents over 90 percent, we can say
95 percent
of the population. Our people have never lost confidence in my words. When the Soviet
-
Union told me in 1971 something to the effect "show us if you can make a decisive
year with or without our approval," the .gist was that it refused to send weapons. And
as Brezhnev later told Ahmad Isma'il, may God bless his soul, in 1973: I have halted
the weapons to As-Sadat because he is hotheaded and because he is about to involve us
in an operation which would take us I know not where. I am the one who had stopped
the weapons. That was a lie. At that time Brezhnev did not tell me that he had
stopped the weapons. At that time.he had said that there was a procedure to be followed,
that the ships had been delayed and I don't know what else. But I had visited him
four times in Moscow.
[Question] Therefore, if the Soviet experts had not left we would not have waged a
battle?
[Answer] This is included in what I had in mind since I took office. I told you how
I had formed my .strategy and That I had simplified it for the people. I could have
said this in complicated terms and it would have been difficult for the people to under-
stand. I have told you what the basis of my strategy was. It told it also to 'Abd
an-Nasir. I told him: Jamal, if we win 10 centimeters of the east bank of the canal
and hold them, we will change the entire situation. The second thing in my strategy--
'
if you ask me, and because in military and political science it happens, as happened
in World War II--is that the president of the country is the supreme commander of the
armed forces. This is so throughout the world. The head of state sends to the com-
mander in chief what is called strategic guidance. What is this? This is a paper
which the head of state signs and sends to the commander in chief of the armed forces
telling him what the political position is, what the solutions available to us are,
what the international changes around us are and what the ultimate aim of the battle
is. When we go back to Churchill's war memoirs we will find that the strategic guidance
went to Eisenhower. When we go back to our previous wars--in the three wars before 1973
there was no such thing. This strategic guidance given in 1973 is being kept with
the military records of Marshal Isma'il. I issued this guidance in 1973 sometime before
the battle., because this paper gives the commander the general strategic lines on which
he will have to base his battle plans. There is another thing which the president of
'
I
the republic must issue, namely, the order of battle. The combat order is issued a few
days before the scheduled time of the battle. This order was issued on Tuesday, 2
*
October.
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The people have heard me relate the story. When I signed the order, I was in Al-Jizah.
When I signed the order and handed it to Field Marshal Ismail, I told him: Ahmad,
where will the ball be next Tuesday? It was Tuesday. The battle was to start on
Saturday. By the following Tuesday, 3 days would have passed. I told him: Ahmad,
where will the ball be next Tuesday? One base on which I had built my strategy was
on what I told Ahmad. I told him: It is more honorable for us to die at the canal
while fighting. The generations after us will say that we did not accept the state of
r
no peace-no war and the disgrace, but that we fought and were defeated. Those who come
after us will complete the battle. This is the worst circumstance to be in. No, I
cannot Just stay like this. What will be, will be. But things turned out all right.
You asked me about the Russian experts. This was part of my strategy, like the thing
about the 10 centimeters [in Sinai]. I will not fight a battle while there is one
single Soviet expert on Egyptian territory. Why? The Soviet experts were forbidden
by Russia and by us to approach the canal area. The Russians are here and the matter
is clear. The Russian experts were forbidden by Russia and by us to approach the
canal zone. Because this is our army. This is one thing. The second thing is that
during my four visits to Moscow--in March 1971, October 1971, February 1972 and
April 1972, four visits in less than one year; the minutes exist for every visit--I
used to begin my talks with the three Soviet leaders by telling them: There are two
points: The .first point is that I did not want any Soviet soldier to fight my battle;
the second point is that I do not seek a confrontation between you and the Americans,
because the one who seeks a confrontation between the two superpowers, who possess
destructive weapons, wants to destroy the whole world. I said this to reassure them.
But they were not reassured, and they did not want to be reassured. One of the other
strategic bases on which I built my battle was that no Russian expert should remain on
Egyptian territory. Why? For the reason I mentioned to you.
The other thing, which
is most important, is that every battle we waged during the war of attrition, whether
in the air or on the ground, we won it against Israel--we won the battle of the Al-Jazirah
al-Khadra, we won the artillery battles which forces the Israelis to use their air
force in July 1969, we won air battles against the Israelis over Ismailia.
Their Mirages were hit. They thought they were kings of the skies, everytime we won a
battle against them, they would say that it was carried out by the Soviets. Strange:
I was aware that the Soviets became happy when they heard this. If the battle succeeded--
according to my simple calculation, the calculation of the Egyptian peasant, the sons
of our country everywhere--if I succeeded, the Soviets would attribute the success to
themselves; but if I failed, the Soviets would attribute the failure to me. So, why
should I not fight the battle alone from the beginning? If there is to be blame, then
the blame should fall on me and if there is to be success, then the success should be
mine. This is one of the basis of (?my strategy).
Therefore, the decision regarding the Soviets was not new. Never. Strategically, I
had decided never to start a battle--my battle with Israel--while there was a single
Soviet expert on Egyptian soil.
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However, this [the expulsion of Soviet experts from Egypt] could have been done in a
"
more gentle way than it was done had.they not issued the statement on lack of fighting
ability and treated me the way they did--in a way in which I never want to be treated
-
*
nor want to treat anyone. Where have we reached?
[Question] We have reached the date just after Your Excellency took office in 1971
and the beginning of 1972.
[Answer] In 1972, after the decisive year.
[Question] Yes.
[Answer] In 1972, I defended the Soviets while I was suppressing the bitterness and
the pain. I went to them. The last visit was in 1972. My last visit to Moscow was
in April 1972. They asked me to go to them. On the previous 3 visits, I insisted on
going. This time they insisted that I go even if only for 24 hours. Why? It so
happened that Nixon was going to visit them in 1 month to discuss the issue of detente.
Nixon was going to visit Moscow for the first time. After the visit, the statement on
lack of military ability was issued.
Some say that the Soviet Union has a policy. All right. Yesterday, a U.S.-Soviet
statement was issued. I have been telling them always that the big powers' stand is
one--the United States and the Soviet Union. There is no need to attribute to the
Soviet Union stands which it does not uphold but uses for propaganda. However, the
.statement
was issued yesterday or the day before yesterday--the statement with which
the foreign ministers of the -entire world agreed but which is now exciting Israel and
getting on its nerves.
I have been saying so all my life but nobody believed me. After the detente, after this
and after the neglect they showed and the story of the Soviet experts, which I have
often explained, I issued my decision and removed the Soviet experts. Something then
happened that served me in what is called strategic deception. As we have strategic
guidance in which the civilian chief of state sends to the military commander in chief
the complete picture and ,the changes and so forth and the aim of the battle, we also
have strategic deception which we began as soon as we started preparing for our battle.
What is strategic deception? It is a plan to make the enemy facing me believe that I am
not ready for war. As simple as that. What helped me in 'this was the Soviet Union,
without realizing it.
As part of the campaign of violence it launched against me, the Soviet Union sent word
to the experts and to its agents, the agents of the Soviet Union, the Soviet left not
the Egyptian left--no, the leftist agents I have here. It sent them instructions to
attack, that is; to attack the regime in 1972. There was sectarian strife at the time.
They said that there was sectarian strife. In the university, the agents moved among
the students. I thank God that the students here have always been a sound lot. Those
elements were small gangs all their lives. However, they rose up and demonstrated.
This is a long story.
As'part of the operation, what did the Soviet Union do? It was fighting me, not knowing
-
that it was serving me in an indirect manner. No. It was doing me the greatest service
in history and affording me the great opportunity in the strategic deception I was trying
to implement. The Soviet Union leaked a paper to the Arab nation and to the West.
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It leaked it to the Arab nation so that it would bl'ame me. It leaked a paper, a report,
that the missiles and the electronic equipment and all the technology Egypt had received
from the Soviets collapsed after the departure of the Soviet experts and that Egypt was
t
not ready for war.
Who grabbed this report? Israel grabbed it with everflowing happiness fust as the West
*
and the Arabs grabbed it. Everybody was convinced that I was not goint to fight that
I was finished. Some of the Arab nation reached the conclusion that I took the step
of expelling the Soviet experts so as not to fight and so as to have an excuse for my
people and the Arab nation for not being ready because I had expelled the Soviet experts.
[Question] What were your personal feelings as you were preparing for the battle and
had almost set the time and while you were being attacked by all the sides on .the grounds
that Your Excellency was not going to start the battle?
(Answer] First, I considered it a strategic deception serving two aims. Second, I did
waver a single moment.
Everything I am telling you took place within very narrow
circles of the intelligentsia. I called them cells at the time. As for the Egyptian
worker and peasant base, the sons of the country who constituted over 95 percent of the
population, they believed in their battle and in everything I said. This is why I called
them intelligentsia cells. They used to come to me in 1973 or 1972 saying that every-
thing had collapsed. They also came up with this story. They said that the situation
was bad and that Egypt was finished. They wrote and sent reports to the foreign
correspondents who in turn published that Egypt was finished after the exit of the experts,
that there was to be no battle, that As-Sadat was not serious, that As-Sadat could do
nothing and was procrastinating, and that the international situation was also bad and
so on and so forth. All this was done by some intelligentsia cells. However, the basic
Egyptian foundations on which I relied were firm. In those days they wondered where my
self-confidence came from. They did not realize that my self-confidence came from this.
[Question] Did the articles which exaggerated and magnified things--of course,
the enemy had formidable fortifications and everything--what they exaggerated was the
seriousness of the confrontation with the enemy, saying that the Israeli soldier was
invincible and that the crossing of the canal and destruction of the Bar-Lev line and
the fortifications were impossible--did these affect our soldiers and our military plans?
[Answer] They have never affected our military plans--never. .But they vexed the officers
and the soldiers. The articles which appeared in AL-AHRAM enraged the officers and
soldiers who took part in the battle. I told this to the author, who was the AL-AHRAM
chief editor. I told him this. They came to me at the front and told me: We will
accept no such thing, nor is it appropriate to write such things about the battle.
What was baffling was that those who were at the front had cut out the articles and
brought them to me. My children were so upset--not only those at the front, but also
at Inshas airport. All the pilots brought me the articles and said to me: Have you
seen the lies?
I drew the author's attention to this. He later discoverd that it was a question of
some imagining that they could write on policy and war. The result was their confusinig
policy, confusing war and confusing themselves.
**
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They do not confuse anyone else. In. other words, I was not confused at all, My sons
on the front, as I have told you, had cut out the articles and kept them. When I went
to them they said that such reports were not true.
The .broad popular base was annoyed by the reports. It was a shame. Only those worthless
people weak in spirit believed these articles,. but the broad masses, the intelligentsia
and all the armed forces denounced them. These articles really had no effect, as was
proven by the October war.
[Question] What happened was indeed an epic despite all of' the previous exaggerations
It was a massive task, but to say that it was difficult and impossible to cross the canal
;
was something else,
[Answer] I would like to say something which .I would like our people to know, As I say,
it was shameful that one should write about something that was not his business and claim
that he was a politician when he did not understand politics or claim to be a military
man when he did not understand anything about war. When a person writes about a battle,
should he not at least have had some military knowledge, even limited knowledge? What
was the so-called Bar-Lev line? Why did I start the war with the confidence that I had?
1 ,What
was the reason? The reason was very simple.
I am a. politician more than a military
man. But as a military man, I combine both. I know the problems of my country and of
the world around us,
One day I got a book. We were in the same hall. I got a book on the battle of Normand
or, in other words, the Allies' offensive in Europe when Hitler was occupying all of
Europe. I believe it was in 1944, I was a military man with some military knowledge in
addition to what I had learned in other fields. I read the whole book with much enjo
t
because it was a compilation of documents, It was not a to
h
ben
y {
written .about tne war in the Pacific, the Atlantic, England,.france and America; A million;
.I
stories had been written; but this book contained .documents .taken from .war diaries. For
every battle there is a thing called a war diary. I will talk to
-
one day and
see if.he can show our people the war diary, A war diary records everything that happens
every day of -the battle--everything that happens,, whether for us or against us, plus a
change of plans--everything that happens in the 24 hours of every day.
The book I got was compiled from the war diaries of the armies of various countries. As
you know, there were the Americans, the British, the French, the Dutch and many others,
but of course in the main it was the British, the Americans arx1 the French--no, the French
did not assume a role for the Allies did not want to acknowledge De Gaullers role
I
mean they did not want to give De Gaulle any role or anything, Basically, these war
diaries--this book--were derived from the British war accounts of Montgomery and the
American diaries of the five armies which took part and of Eisenhower.
I read the book. I had some military education. I have background knowledge and I am
familiar..withmy country's battles. During World War II, I was held in detention; so I
read. What else could I do but read and follow events?
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When they built the Bar-Lev line they said it was better than the old French Maginot
line and the German Siegfried line. They spent over $300 million on it. Legendary
stories were told about it and they were true. It is there. I have kept many points
on the l.ine intact so that people can come and see for themselves. It was impenetrable
by artillery shells or bombs. The four artillery pieces which shelled Suez and blew
up our oil depots were positioned on a rear slope protected by reinforced concrete that
could withstand artillery shelling. No fire could damage it or even penetrate its
protective shield. Bombs weighing up to 2,000 pounds could not destroy it. Why?
Because as I have told you, the artillery pieces were behind hill and were protected
by reinforced-concrete. So the only way was to go in and storm it. This is why they
said it was impregnable, because they could not imagine that the Egyptians would go in,
outflank the line and do what they did. Impossible.
When I read the book I found in it many useful lessons that we could follow. I looked
at the Bar-Lev line and compared it to what Hitler called the Atlantic wall. When he
occupied Europe, Hitler took up positions in anticipation of the Allied invasion of
Europe and built up what was called the Atlantic wall. These are old times I am talking
about. I am an old man and you are all young.
Anyone reading the papers during World War II would notice, without making any special
effort, that the Atlantic wall was repeated many times every day.
Hitler erected the so-called Atlantic wall to confront any invasion.
To talk about the Bar-Lev line, well, the Jews are extremely fond of what the Germans
call Blitzkrieg. All the Israeli army's training is training on Blitzkrieg warfare
which was first
introduced by Germany. They say that Germany burned to death 6,000
[presumably meaning 6 million] of them and so on and so forth, but they use the very
methods which they say they condemn. Militarily they admire Germany very much. In
fact every military man in the world should admire Germany because Germany is the mother
of militarism in the world. However, anyone who thinks that Israel is a superhuman
genius is mistaken. The Bar-Lev line was a carbon copy of the Atlantic wall. This was
-due to their admiration for German tactics first and their army creed second. In
military terms when you talk about creed it does not mean you are talking about religion.
In military matters when you talk about creed you are talking about military doctrine.
Does one follow the Eastern doctrine representing Russia, its allies and others, or does
one follow the Western doctrine which represents the United States, Britain, France and
others? Each of these doctrines varies according to the types of arms of each army.
The Russian Army has its own doctrine alined with Soviet weapons and their performance.
The Western doctrine is alined with Western weapons and their performance.
Simply the Bar-Lev line was nothing but a smaller version of the Atlantic wall, in my
opinion, If I were to tell this to the layman, whom would I convince? One would ask
me, first what is the Atlantic wall and what do you mean a smaller version? I would
have no time to explain, but it is different with my military men. This is a chance
for the country to know what kind of armed forces it has. The military in Egypt have
adopted both the Eastern and the Western doctrines. They visited Normandy after the war.
They attended the highest institutes in Russia, Britain and the United States--the best
military institutes. Therefore, we have the fruit of both doctrines. When I talk of
them, they understand me immediately.
_ . _ .
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After one of the military meetings, when Al-Jamasi was only chief of operations, not
chief of staff or higher, I had the book with me, so I told him: Al-Jamasi, take this
!
j
book. I have marked all the useful passages. It was all clear there. I told him:
The Bar-Lev line is all here but on a smaller scale. All the tactics that Germany
used in resisting the Allied invasion of Normandy is here in. this book and they will
use them against.you. You will find that the .Atlantic wall had three defensive zones
right on~the edge of the Atlantic. The Bar-Lev line is a concrete werll. right along
the canal. The positions are built of more than Just concrete. The chambers have
double roofs, one of which is built of railroad ties taken from the Egyptian railways
in the Sinai. A second concrete roof is built above these ties.
This meant that neither the artillery nor the air force or anything else would be able
to penetrate it. The first line in the Atlantic wall erected by Hitler to deter the
Allies, namely the reinforced concrete, coincided with the points directly on the
canal, right on the canal. The Atlantic wall had a second line including reserves and
alternate positions. The same thing applied to the Bar-Lev line. The third line
included most of the reserves which, if approached from the front positions or the
second line, would move, spread out and encircle and exterminate the -enemy. Such was
the German military doctrine. To know my enemy, the first thing I must do is learn
the military doctrine of that enemy.
I.
Only military people know this; not ordinary but knowledgeable military people know
it. But we must enlighten our people and our country so that they will know both
doctrines. But my children in the forces know both doctrines and thus it did not take
me long to draw up plans with them. There was one thing: .The Jews could not tolerate
a loss of men on the -Bar-Lev line. That was why they had built it in three lines so.
that its positions would be strong and save them from using a large number of men.
When a position is strong, fewer men and weapons have to be deployed. The impregnability
of the position would make it possible to deploy fewer men. That was one Jewish
mistake which they copied from Germany. The second mistake was that the Jews were
overconfident. They had believed that we could not storm the Bar-Lev line and that
if we had wanted to storm it we would have had to storm it from the rear.
I recall--and so do my son commanders of .the armed forces who can hear me now--that
in February 1973 after 6 and 1/2 hours on the Ar-Raml front, I came to them and told
them: I want to tell you something. The first 24 hours are the decisive ones. The
side which wins in the first 24 hours wins the battle because the first 24 hours are
decisive. The Jews had never imagined that even a single tank would .cross over in the
first 24 hours. A few soldiers and tanks from the three lines of the Bar-Lev line,
which is their "Atlantic Wall," would attack whoever crosses. That was a.terrible
mistake in their plan--a mistake which they have recently admitted. It was a mistake
in their plan and in their estimates--in what in military terms we call the estimate
of the situation.
We base our military planning on our estimate of the situation. What does an evaluation
of the situation involve? The estimate of the situation should cover the enemy's
equipment, preparations and fortifications. It should also cover our equipment, our
forces, air force and tanks. The first part of our estimation should begin with the
enemy and then us. The next part of the estimation is called "the influencing factors",
namely, the factors which would affect the enemy and the factors which -would affect us.
In the end, the plan is drawn up on the basis of the estimation.
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After they had made an estimate of the situation they said publicly--they are clever
military people; no one can say that Israel is poor militarily. Never; they are
clever without any doubt. I am showing here how I relied on this and exploited it
in strategic deception. Theysaid that As-Sadat had only one of three possibilities.
The first was that he would directly seize the goose neck (raqabat al-wizzah]. What
is the goose neck? The goose neck is the area extending from Al-Qantarah east to
Port Said. Why did they call it the goose neck? Because this area is actually that
part of the Suez Canal from Al-Qantarah to Port Said. Near it is a fresh water canal,
then comes Buhayrat al-Manzilah, a swamp. This area lies in the northern part of
the west bank. On the east bank, there is a road on the east and then comes
Al-Mallahah up to Port Said. What does all this mean? It means that I only have the
road on the canal in the West and they have the road in the east. Al-Mallahah, which
is on their side, and A1-Manzilah; which is on my side, would make it impossible for
!
me to put up fortifications or to deploy guns and troops and the same thing would
-
Iapply
to them.
Why do we call this area the goose neck? Because it is 40 km long and extends from
Al-Qantarah to Port Said.
The neck [al-raqabah] ends at Al-Qantarah because then the
desert begins.
'
Israel had the desert in Sinai and I had the farm land of the west bank.
So they said As-Sadat had three choices.
The Israelis even said so officially before
the battle. The first choice would be for him to take the goose neck--and this was
indeed possible because our artillery was more powerful than theirs. The battle would
thus have been confined to the 45 km from Al-Qantarah to Port Said, leaving the remain-
ing 180-km front from there to Suez to them. The second choice would be for As-Sadat
to cross with one division along a 180-km front. Naturally when I have to cross a front
180 km long with one division things do not stop here. No, we would have to establish
what in military terms is known as a bridgehead. To establish a bridgehead means that
I would have to cross as the"allies did during their assault on Hitler's Atlantic wall.
* I.
They landed with five armies. Each had a bridgehead on which the army would land and
secure a line and a firm position and then advance. In our case, they said As-Sadat's
second choice would be for him to bring in one division. They hoped this would happen,
although they did say that even this was too big an operation for Egypt and the
Egyptians could not do it and that they were in a bad shape, and so on. Why did they
hope that the Egyptians would choose this option? Because along a 180-km front a
division would have to establish a bridgehead to advance from, and so before it manages
to advance it would be encircled completely, that is from three sides with its back to
the canal. The division would thus be encircled with tanks--from the second and third
lines of the Europe wall or the Bar-Lev line where the fast-moving tank reserves were
positioned. These tanks would encircle the division from all sides and then gradually
finish it off, killing as many as they liked and taking prisoners as they like. This
would have been an ideal situation for them.
The third option, they said, was that he would cross with, more than one division and
more than one bridgehead. They ruled this out because that meant that the Egyptian
army would have to have the ability to wage a battle requiring coordination among the
various arrned forces branches which only the big powers were capable of doing. What
does combined arms mean? A battle involving more than one division combines the navy,
the army, the air force and the air defense branch. Coordination among all these is
termed a joint operation.
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Only the superpowers were supposed to .be capable of such coordinated action. Even
these powers did not just have this type of capability. They acquired it through
experience in actual combat. Only those who actually experienced it in practice are
capable of it.
Question] We did it.
[Answer] Yes, this is what I am saying. They ruled out this third option completely.
This was published before the war. This third option was the one we took.
Let us compare our battle with that of Normandy. This is for those who sometimes
poke their noses into matters which they do not understand. The Bar-Lev line was like
the Atlantic wall. The allies landed with five armies. We crossed with five divisions,
five bridgeheads. We also waged a battle involving coordination between various
services--navy, air force, army and missiles. We waged that kind of battle and we
experienced it. When we acooplished this the Jews were dumbfounded and they were
surprised. They were totally helpless because they had imagined anything but this.
They could not imagine that the 1967 hodgepodge [army] could establish five bridge.
heads and advance. They said that it would be heroic if the Egyptian Army could
[
establish just one bridgehead with one division; this would be an achievement. Not
only did we do that, but we committed five divisions along the 180 km front. Each
division simultaneously took its positions successfuly and the confrontation began
and the battles of tanks, artillery--we waged battles they Never imagined.
II
[Question] What about the air strike?
[Answer] This was all part of the battle strategy, Here I would like to say that I
advise many analysts not to get involved in things that they know absolutely nothing
about, People ask me: Were you confident when you entered the battle? Yes, I had
towidne
Iin the Almighty and in myself, and I was 90 percent sure that I was going
to win. I was sure that not a single soldier would retreat from the bridgeheads and
this was actually the case. Even when the Israelis crossed into the bulge not a single
soldier left his position in all the five divisions, absolutely no one. The five divi-
;c
sions remained in their positions until after after the bulge and until Israel pulled
back to the passes. Why? Because Israel does not have enough men and cannot man 180
km. I can.
There are many factors. I have had military training. If I were the Israeli prime
minister telling my defense minister to defend Sinai andlthe entirehfrontawhichrimhave
taken from the Arabs, Israel would require 20 armies and even these would not be enough
because this is not an easy front. The 180 km are only part of the front, for there
is also the southern Sinai. The 180 km are part of the Egyptian front that would
require five armies and not just five divisions for Israel to defend.
[Question] They had forgotten that the Egyptian soldier had stormed through.
[Answer] They were surprised. Why
only alternative I had was to carry ouBethegoose tneck operation or send ho divisionthe
They thought that I would act foolishly and send a division. They excluded the
possibility of more than one bridgehead and the use of five divisions never occurred
to them,
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37
They imagined that two or three divisions at the most would be used. Why two divisions?
In order to assist each other. Two divisions can assist each other and defend their
positions. They never imagined that there would be more than two or three divisions.
I used five divisions at the same time. I won but not during the first 24 hours but
with the air force strike which took only 20 minutes. I was sitting in the operations
room at the time. It took only 2 hours. This room is like any other combat operations
room which we see in films. The microphone announced that the Egyptian Air Force had
crossed the canal. Husni Mubarak was wonderful in the air battle. From over 30 air-
fields and bases, the planes with twice the speed of sound would take off at the exact
time--in military terminology we call this synchronization. The aircraft taking off
from 30 bases in various parts of Egypt had calculated their speed and crossed the
canal at the same time. Why? Because if some planes crossed before others, this would
give a warning to the Jews over there. The 222 planes had to reach the canal together
so as to surprise and destroy. If one squadron went first and another squadron followed
10 minutes later, this would have warned the Jews and the squadron would have been hit.
No, 222 planes from all the airfields in the republic reached the canal in one wave at
the same time, to the exact second. I am lost for words as to what this wave caused.
Whenever I think of this, my spirits are uplifted.
Our children did not wait for the order to cross. As soon as the wave of planes
arrived, they crossed the canal. They did not wait for the order to cross. They knew
right away when to cross. Many things took place during the battle, not heroic things
but things that demonstrate the magnificence of the Egyptian soldier and officer.
[Question] Mr President, the decision to go to war was the most serious decision in
our modern history. Did you make this decision alone and how much time passed bef ore
you told anyone else? The final decision?
[Answer] As I told you the strange thing is that in 1971, 4 months after I assumed
office, I spoke about the war as an alternative unless they agreed to peace. I never
contradicted myself until the battle took place. I also did not respond to all the
idle talk uttered at the time. As I told you, my words rest on a scientific basis and
haphazard talk by someone to make me be afraid or someone writing telling me there are
pipes to carry napalm to the canal. So, let there be pipes. I sent the children the
night before the-attack and they blocked all the pipes. However, when we reached the
east bank, we found the napalm storage tanks empty and we had blocked the pipes for
nothing. We actually did block the pipes. Really there were pipes to carry napalm
but-the tanks were empty. Because the Jews were sure that Egypt would not move. This
was based on scientific calculations as I told you. We had to know Israel's ideology
and then confront it. This is what makes a commander succeed in battle.
This was a basic goal if the Jews did not withdraw. Indeed, if the Jews had accepted
my initiative in 1971, they would have played the dirtiest trick on us: the spirit
of defeat would have remained in our hearts. When we waged the battle, we regained
our self-confidence, our people regained their self-confidence, the Arabs also regained
their self-confidence.
You ask me about my feeling. I never despaired; hope never left me for a moment. How-
ever, 99 percent of them did not believe me.
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[Question) Did you make the decision in February [1973]; Your Excellency?
[Answer] No. I made my decision as far back as the days when I submitted my initiative
in February 1971.
A decision in military terms passes through a number of stages. This
is a vast scientific field. The decision I made in February 1971, when I announced my
initiative, was that the only alternative to that initiative would be war. I knew that
the Jews would not respond to the initiative. Why? Because I knew what they did .before
'Abd an-Nasirt
s death, and I was well aware'of how they turned down the Rogers plan. So
there was nothing in the air. The reason I submitted my initiative was to demonstrate
my good will to the world and to show that I wanted peace. I knew deep down, however,
that the Jews thought we were a corpse. So, my decision dates'back to those days, when,
however, did it enter the phase of implementation? In 1971 and 1972 the Soviet Union
gave me a hard time, so 'I expelled the experts. On 1 January 1973 the structure of the
plan was laid down, at a time when all were saying that Egypt was finished, and that
included the foreign press and some intellectuals abroad as well as Russia's agents and
so on. All these said that nothing would happen, but the vast popular base was with me
because they know me and I know them. -
The framework of the plan was laid down on 1 January. In February, the sand plan--Sinai,
every grain of sand and every hill and feature was laid out and studied at the armed
forces headquarters. It took about 6 hours. The third phase took place in Sidi Maryut,
in a small house, a shack--there is a picture of it and I want it included in the documents
of the October war--I and Minister Ismail [then war minister] were alone. It was in March. t
I told him: Isma'il, give me the final plan.. We had formulated the plan the beginning
of January. In February we had the sand plan. In March, I said I want the final plan,
Isma'il. He said: Yes Sir. In April, Hafiz al-Asad visited me in Sidi Maryut in Burj
al-'Arab. He visited me secretly. Nobody knew about this visit and no .photos or anything
were taken. He landed at Janaklis Airport and Marshal Isma'il brought him by plane to me ,
in Burj al-'Arab. I said: Hafia, I am going to war this year. What do you think? He
said: I am in with you,
Well, our meetings lasted 3 days. Only two people knew about them. One was Marshal
Isma'il, may God bless his soul, and the other was General al-Jamasi who was chief of
operations. Ahmad Isma'il attended one or two of our meetings which otherwise were
restricted to Hafiz al-Asad and myself. This was in April 1973. One day Ahmad Isma'il
brought me a report by Al-Jarnasi in his own handwriting, at my request, on the most suitable
times for launching an offensive.
Scientifically, one can know everything about every
day of the year from 1. January to 31 December.
With science one can know everything about
every single day--things like tides, moonlight or whatever changes occur. One cannot go
wrong except on very minor things but the basics are derived from seven sciences,
Al-Jamasi wrote the report in his own handwriting because nobody was supposed to know about
it, even if the typist was the most trustworthy. Well, Al-Jamasi is not only an officer,
he is an authority on military affairs, He reported on all these things. He saw the East
and the West and placed a division in the West and a division in the East. Nothing escaped
him. He derived it fram the seven sciences. What happens every day. This is important
as far as the canal is concerned, because it has tides. Sometimes when tide is greater
than 1 and 1/2 meters it is impossible to cross to the other side. On some days during
the year the tide ranges between 50 centimeters to 1 and 1/2 meters,
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We decided that a 50-90 centimeter tide was aoceptable but 1 meter to 1 and 1/2 meters
was unaooeptable because the boats crossing the canal would end up away from their
original destination or would completely turn around and would thus create an impossible
situation. These changes in the canal are a result of its link with the Mediterranean
and the Red Sea.
In April, Hafis and I sat down and read this report. In April, Hafia and I sat down and
read the report written by Al-Jamasi. The report noted that every day of the year from
1 January to 31 December natural changes occur according to the seven sciences and that
there would be three periods which would be suitable for timing an offensive. The first
period would be in May, the second in August and September and the third in September and
October. Science dictates that matters are not in the hand of the individual and that
things cannot take place at any time. This meant that the May period must start on 23 May
and not before. Military science has reached such high levels. It has become one of the
world's most advanced technologies.
Dates were also fixed for the August and the September and October periods. We decided to
give priority to 6 October, We were still in April and we still had May, June, July, August,
September and October to go.
(Himmat Mustafa is heard in the background saying "the Day
of Atonement") The report, which was based on the seven sciences, included notes on
events in Egypt and Israel. It indicated the dates of the Day of Atonement and Ramadan.
-
Details of these two occasions were included in the report.
However, the factor that had to be favorable on the day chosen was the weather, making
it possible for me to cross peacefully with my forces. If that were to happen the first
hour would be the decisive hour.
We were still in April. Hafi read the report and we agreed that we should let the May
period go by. However, we did something during that period. I told him to go to the
Soviet Union for they had not yet sent me any weapons. Brezhnev was supposed to visit the
United States in May to return a visit which Nixon had made to the Soviet Union the year
before.
I told Hafis to go to the Russians because they had not sent me any weapons while I was
planning for the battle. I am entering the battle without any doubt. Tell them that we
might carry out the operation in May. When he went and told them that what was their
response? They sent me a very small quantity of weapons, most of which were not used in
the battle,. Why? Because regrettably the troops were still being trained in their use.
However, I had reserves because I knew the Russians would not give me all-out support or
stand by me. What I had expected actually happened. In my strategic maneuvering, I
depended, as I told you, on the fact that the Israelis were extraordinary militarists.
They,.like us, would depend on the seven sciences. When they chose a day for the offensive
* they would not leave it to chance. When they set zero hour they just don't say "come,
let's go." No, their knowledge is identical to ours. However, they were ahead of us in
one thing: It was their senior officers who had fought in previous wars, Nothing equals
combat experience. This is an established fact. Egypt is not worried now because it has
experienced cadres, Egypt's sons have fought in wars and have war experience.
Before 23 May, I directed the newspapers to carry hot news. There were also Koranic
recitations about Al-Jihad, maneuvers on the front and so on and so forth. The Israelis
also took these activities seriously. Israel knew, just as I knew, that an offensive was
possible on 23 May because that day was right militarily, scientifically and fit in with
all of my calculations. But I launched the campaign 5 days earlier.
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Dayan declared at the time: As-S adat has done
this to us twice. Each time we had to
spend $10 million on general mobilization just for nothing. Dayan did not say anything.
He did not say that when As-Sadat heats up the situation,.this is themost suitable time for
Egypt and for Egypt's military men, who understand Israel, and that there might be an
attack. Had I done this at any other time of the year, -he would not have minded. Why?
Because he knew that I would be beaten if I had chosen the day in accordance with my
calculations based on the seven. sciences.
However, he saw me acting before the right time. When he calculated scientifically and
militarily that there was a possibility, he acted right away. He acted twice, once dur-
ing the May period. I said that we.must use these periods for strategic deception. Once
was in May and the. other. time was 'in August. Before the fixed date, I used to heat up the
situation by publishing Koranic verses in the .newspapers. The chief editor of AL-AHRAM
refused to do this, as .I. once said, because he wanted me to explain what was going on,
but I had no time to explain to anybody, especially since he claimed knowledge in both
political. and military affairs. He did not publish these verses in AL-AHRAM but the
other newspapers published them. Israel was aware of this because it read the papers.
When they felt the situation was heating up, they acted. In May they spent
$10 million
on general mobilization. In August too they spent $10 million on mobilization. In
neither case did I attack and the -days which. were suitable for attack passed. When
October came and they felt that there might be an attack, Dayan told them; No, we had
to spend $10 million each time. No. Twice was enough.
In my strategic maneuvering, I took into account their military efficienc and their
understanding of military science. It was no longer a, question of taking chances or a
matter of the center, the right flank or the left flank. No i.t is a very complicated
matter.
[Question] Mr President, of course, we should not miss the opportunity here to ask about
the effect of the war on the two superpowers and our Arab world--the effect of victory.
[Answer] There isn't much time. I have been speaking for 3 hours already.
[Question] Mr President, the occasion is more important than time.
[Answer] The people will get bored and tired.
[Question] No, Mr President.
[Answer] Regarding the effects of the war, as I have said, I will again simply say...
[interrupted by interviewer]
[Question] There, are very many details about the war which Your Excellency can discuss
but we are being brief.
[Answer] I am happy about one thing. I willstop going into detail at this point. The
military men can talk to you about the details of the battle. However, I am happy about
one thing. Dayan had said in the first months after the 1967 defeat that he was sitting
by the telephone waiting for me to ask him about the conditions of surrender. Dayan
repeated this in Sinai. On the fourth day and in front of all the foreign correspondents
he cried like a child. He admitted in front of everybody that the road to Tel Aviv was
open and Israel could not make the Egyptians budge one inch. Indeed, as I have said,
despite the bulge, none of my soldiers budged one inch backward. Never. The bulge
ended and they moved to the east bank. It is then that I began reducing my soldiers in
Sinai.
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What put Israel back on its feet and saved it from leaving the road to Tel Aviv open,
as Dayan had said in front of all the world newsmen? There were two things. First of
all, the United States entered the war on the side of Israel and sent equipment to Al-
'Arish, behind the front, on my soil and in my country.
[Question) Had Israel asked for help?
-
[Answer] Right. It had asked for help. I have told this story before. I said that
their appeal was: "Save Israel, aid Israel. We need 400 tanks immediately because we
lost that many tanks on the Egyptian front." Of course, the United States officially
recorded this appeal. When did they make this appeal? It was on the fourth day, Tuesday,
10 [as heard) October. On Thursday, 4 [as heard) October, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba
Eban was in the United States. He attended the General Assembly meeting in September
and then left [presumably for New York] because of the Jewish appeal fund
in the United
States. Kissinger was the secretary of state at the time. Rogers had gone and Kissinger
assumed the post of secretary of state. Kissinger sent for Abba Eban to meet with him.
Eban called on Kissinger in his office on 4 October, 2 days before the battle. At the
time in 1973, Kissinger had met twice with Hafiz Isma'il, our national security adviser,
in Paris. I announced the visit at the time. It was not a secret visit.
Hafiz Isma'il discussed with Kissinger the question of settlement and expressed our
opinion on peace and a peaceful settlement. Kissinger told Hafiz Isma'il
very frankly:
"You talk as though you were the victors. The world deals
with facts. You have been
defeated. Speak one language and then the United States will be able to extend aid to
you. But let us be practical. You are talking as though you were the "victors. You
must know that facts should influence all actions. We cannot perform miracles for you
as long as you are in your present position. You must change the status quo.
Hafiz Ismail asked: "How can we change it?" Kissinger answered: "Through a military
battle. If the position is not changed militarily, I cannot do anything. I wish you
to convey some advice from me to As-Sadat. I have not seen him and do not know him."
Our relations with the United States were severed at that time. Kissinger told Isma'il:
"I have not. seen 'As-Sadat.and do not know him. But I
feel that the man wants to conduct
a dialog. and wants to build his country. Give him some advice from me. Tell. him: Do
not try to change the military situation because another defeat of the 1967 type would
do away with any hope for a peaceful or any other settlement. Nobody would be able to
speak to Israel."
This conversation took place in just such frankness. When did this happen? It happened
in February and April 1973. We now. come to 4 October 1973. Israeli Foreign Minister
Abba Eban made his speech at the General Assembly in September. In October he went on a
tour to collect funds. On 4 October, Kissinger asked to see him. He met with Kissinger
at his office in the U.S. State Department. Kissinger
told him: "You are the victors
now and the Arabs are the vanquished. The initiative must come- from you to preserve
the dignity of these people."
There was a possibility then. Kissinger had at that
time concluded ,deals on the Vietnam operation, international detente and U.S. relations
with China. Following the few deals he concluded at that time, he was described as the
international magician. He was at that time finished with the intricate Vietnamese
(?problem). Kissinger told Eban: "Let the initiative come from you. There is a man
in Egypt who, we feel, wants to hold a dialog
and turn his attention to building. You
must offer something yourselves."
.....
..-
' 7'
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On 4 October, Abba Eban answered in all simplicity: "Why should we offer anything?
Egypt and the Arabs will not have pplitical or military .strength
for the next 50 years.
They are a corpse. We know the Arabs. Let us deal
with them. Leave us alone and do
not interfere.
-
Eban left and the war broke out 2 days later. This aroused .the pity of Kissinger, who,
as he told me, sought God's help for Egypt and for the East and thought that the
entire issue was over. .He felt that Israel would get on i.ts high horse again. This.
was on Thursday. On Tuesday, 10 October, Dayan said what he said.
You ask what. has
the October war done. Today we can see the nervousness and madness in Israel. There
is an unnatural kind of madness in Israel now. Why .this madness? It is because.the
Israelis. never believed the day would come when the Arabs would be able to fight and
absorb the technology of the first rocket and electronic war in Arab.history. This has
been recorded.
As I have said, the 10 .entimeter.s on the east bank changed everything. These were
not just 10 centimeters--they were 15-20 km.
After the second disengagement, it was
possible for the Arab nation to restore its position and regain confidence in itself.
Arab militarism, Egyptian militarism in particular, was able to regain confidence in
itself. The world is now listening to us because we are now speaking the language of
the age and because we have absorbed the .technology of the age. All our analyses and
actions are based on the technology of the age.. All soldiers. who participated in the
military battle, as I have already said, absorbed this technology. What I have to .say
'
about military science could fill volumes. This is the highest military technology
.
and one of the most complicated sciences in the world. I say that we absorbed all this.
After all this, I do not say no, no, no as we had been doing for the past .25 years.
I say no to what I must say no to and yes to what I can say yes to. We now speak
with
the logic of the age and in accordance with the analysis of the age in which we live.
The whole situation has now changed in West Europe, the United Staetes and the East bloc,
despite the fact that the Soviet Union is .adopting the stand it is adopting. The
Soviet Unionhadused a satellite to photograph our battle from its beginning. I sent
and asked for a copy but it refused to give me one. It photographed the real battle,
I
not a maneuver. No.. It photographed it through the satellite because it had known
- about the start of the battle from President Hafiz al-Asad, as Hafiz and I had agreed.
The battle restored our self-confidence. It is not only a question of the Palestinian
people's problem. No. We must say that the Palestinian problem was about to become
nothing more than a museum. Every visitor to the museum, would utter. a few words saying
there is no. power and no strength 'save in God and the matter would be forgotten. The
battle did much to revive .the Palestinian issue because it touched on the core of the
matter.. The core of the matter, the core of our problem is the Palestinian issue.
We will start with De Gaulle. De Gaulle predicted .this and. said as much to Abba Eban.
This too is among the memories of the battle. Before the
1967 battle, before 1967,
Abba Eban met with De. Gaulle in France. De Gaulle was president of France at the time.
De. Gaulle..had drawn up.a political line at the time. He said: We will renounce and
stand against the state which begins the attack.
When Abba Eban went to him with recordings of Ash-Shuqayri's speeches in which
Ash-Shuqayri said: We will drive them into the sea, etc., De Gaulle told Eban: "Listen,
leave this aside. I would like to tell you something.
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43'
If you begin the attack, we will denounce you and will not stand by you. If Egypt
begins the attack, we will denounce Egypt and will not stand on its side. However,
I would like to tell you something." De Gaulle then told Abba Eban: "If you began
the attack, the Palestinian issue, which is about to become a memory, would be
completely revived." These words were
published then and De Gaulle's prediction came
true because the Palestinian issue is now in its proper place--that is, it is the core
of the problem and not a subsidiary issue or an issue on which the United Nations
issues an annual resolution and which is forgotten after the General Assembly ends.
For 20 years the United States had been approving resolutions. The United States
approved resolutions in 20 UN sessions, but
the Palestinian issue was gradually on the
wane.
Now, thank God, the Palestinian issue has been revived. If the October battle
,had anything to do with this, the credit goes to the Fatah organization, which began
its activities on 1 January 1965, 2 years before the 1967 battle and at the time when
the Palestinian issue was being paid only lipservice by the Arabs. Some of the Arab
regimes used it to attack other regimes, saying: You are a traitor to the basic battle
of the Arabs, you are so and so.
No. If the October battle did anything in this respect, then the Fatah movement, which
began on 1 January 1965 in Syria, must get credit for keeping the issue alive. The
1967 defeat then took place. It did not kill the issue. No, on the contrary, it unified
the feelings and gave Fatah and the other organizations a change to fill the vacuum at
a time when the Arab armies were rebuilding themselves.
Ifthe October battle is to get any credit in this regard, then credit must also go to
Fatah.
[Question] Mr President, at the beginning of this interview you remarked that Israel
is now (?behaving) like it did on 2 June 1967.
What did Your Excellency mean exactly?
[Answer] Actually it was not 2 June, but 1 June to be exact.
It was 4 days before
the battle, on 1 June, Thursday, when (?suddenly) the Israeli cabinet was changed and
a national unity cabinet was formed. This is despite the fact that there was a severe
struggle among the parties. However, when they find there is a threat to Israel, they
unite. A coalition cabinet was formed among odd-partners. The Likud, the Alinement
and the other factions in Israel Who can never get together. However,..when their country
is exposed to danger, all of them unite. When they. get together, there must be some-
thing [word indistinct], especially since Dayan was then a defense minister. Today
Dayan [words indistinct] and Weizman is the agriculture minister [as heard, presumably
referring to Sharon]. He was there at that time. He is now talking about settlements
and so forth. Israel must today be trying to mobilize public opinion (?in the country)
for possibilities which it may undertake. What are these possibilities? We must all
be on a level of alertness and responsibility.
[Question] Mr President, on this historic day, 6 October and as we conclude this
historical talk. by Your Excellency, we ask you to throw more light on the latest stage
reached by our cause, which will be solved, God willing, after the great victory.
[Answer] As the people know and as all my sons have read, Vice President Husni Mubarak
was supposed to begin yesterday--today is.Monday--he was supposed to begin on Sunday a
trip to the Arab countries and Iran in order to convey to them a picture of the situation,
as has been done customarily by us. He was delayed for 1 day.
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No.
It is better that I start from the beginning. Last Friday, I oall
the National
Security Council to meet after the Friday prayers. We sat
for 6 hours. That was on
the basis of a report I had received about.President Carter's meeting with our
foreign minister, .Isma'il Fahmi. For 6 hours we discussed the report and the matters
contained in it and all the alternatives. We expressed our view regarding that. It
was inevitable that I should inform my Arab brothers of Egypt's view.
Why? Because
they share our fate and everything. What
did we decide? I asked the vice president
to go to our Arab brothers, the kings and presidents, to brief them. At the same tine
we wrote our answer and sent it with the (?special envoy) who had brought Isnail
Fahmi's letter. Immediately after the council
meeting, we put our views in writing
and gave it to the envoy who took it to the United States on Sunday. Vie Pesident
Mubarak was supposed, to leave on Sunday to visit the Arab'kings and heads
of state.
At dawn on Sunday, something happened. We received an urgent letter from Isma'il Fahmi,
containing some additions and the latest positiohs and the latest developments in the
situation.
The envoy, our envoy to Isma'il Fahmi has already left. He left after the meeting to
the National Security Council carrying all clear instructions regarding our position.
We delayed Husni's departurea bit because I thought there might be something new in
the new message.
The new message arrived yesterday, Sunday, in the evening and not
in the morning when it was supposed to arrive. I saw nothing new in it to make me
summon the National Security Council again
to reassess the situation and reissue
whatever was necessary to Ismail Fami. True,
I found that there were some develop-
ament, but they did not necessitate [a National Security Council meeting) because they
did not affect the core of what we had discussed and because what we discussed covered
all taffec
thieh
coe onday Vice President Husni Mubarak began the visits to the
Arat kngs This ads hof states and to Iran to brief them on the views of the Egyptian
National Security Council.
On Monday, I received our brother, Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the PLO. We held a
lengthy meeting. After this interview I will complete the session. I acquainted him
with all the details of the situation. During my meeting with him, before the taping
of the interview, King Khalid contacted us. Husni had by then arrived [there]. We
talked, then I cane for the interview. I will resume my meeting with our brother
Yasir 'Arafat after the interview.
What I can say is that in the instructions sent to the foreign minister in New York,
I asked him to request an urgent meeting with President Carter which, God willing, will
take place tomorrow, the th [of October), that is, if President Carter will be ready.
take
but as far as I know the 4th would be the date. At any rate he will ask for
a date to be fixed because it is an
urgent message from me. He will convey the contents
of our message to President Carter which is related to the reconvening of the Geneva
conference, the form of the Geneva conference
as far as the Arabs are concerned, the
PLO position in our view and what we recommend and insist as
a minimum in this
connection and all the topics raised by the foreign minister in the
message he sent us
after his meeting with President Carter.
I.
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I prefer not to make any disclosures now, although much or the gist of the message
will become known to the Arab leaders in the coming 2 days, but I prefer that we
work in quiet diplomacy and not in the manner of the current Israeli emotionalism--
such as the talk about a state of emergency, a coalition government and so on.
[Question] When there is nervousness there, it means there is successes here,
thank God. We thank the president for this patriotio, historic and important inter-
view, on the dearest oooasion to the people of Egypt, the interview with the man
who made the decision. Many happy returns.
[Answer] Many happy returns to you and our people in their victories and construction
based above all on love and on the discard of rancor. Let us look ahead and never
look back. Let our building process be based on the citizen's security and on
-
Egypt's prosperity and position in the world, serving the Egyptians. I pray Almighty
God to grant us success in achieving what we all aspire to. Thank you.
;